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ABSTRACT 
Trade promotion programs that subsidize exports of agricultural products 
continue to be employed in the United States (e.g., the Market Access Program) and 
elsewhere.  In addition, many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia 
and European member states have domestic promotion programs for agricultural 
products that are funded by both industry and government.  Trade promotion programs 
have been heavily criticized as inefficient government expenditures while recently 
Kinnucan and Cai (2010) argue that they also can lead to reductions in domestic 
consumer welfare.   
Here we extend this line of research to examine the market and welfare effects 
of the changes in government export promotion expenditures. An equilibrium 
displacement model that considers domestic and foreign markets, and two types of 
food products— foods and energy-dense foods—has been employed in this study; 
Alston et al. (2009) adopted a similar approach that included healthy and unhealthy 
foods.  Several scenarios are investigated within our framework to quantify the 
impacts of hypothetical changes in government and industry promotion expenditures 
allocated for different purposes on consumers in domestic food markets: i) increased 
expenditures on trade promotion programs, ii) reduced expenditures on trade 
promotion programs, and iii) reduced expenditures on trade promotion programs 
coupled with increased expenditures on domestic promotional efforts.  Furthermore, 
due to the fact that much of the expenditures for export promotions are applied to 
specialty crops, we also examine how changes in government monies spent on 
promotional efforts in foreign markets have impacted domestic consumption of 
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horticultural and non-horticultural products respectively and domestic dietary-intake 
as a whole.  This is done to shed new light on the potential health consequences (in 
terms of caloric and nutrient intake) of government support applied to agricultural 
markets both overseas and in the United States, and further build on a growing 
literature in this area (e.g., Rickard, Okrent and Alston 2012).  Our simulations 
employ promotional elasticities estimated here and demand elasticities published by 
previous studies, in combination with information from government and academic 
sources to parameterize the model. Simulation results show that even modest changes 
in trade promotion expenditures coupled with a corresponding increase in domestic 
promotion efforts have the capacity to influence domestic market conditions, nutrient 
consumption (most notably for dietary fiber and selected micronutrients), and caloric 
intake.   
This research is expected to contribute towards a better understanding of likely 
economic and nutritional effects induced by changes in public funding for export 
promotions on domestic markets across two food categories, horticultural and non-
horticultural products.  We extend previous work in this arena by examining how trade 
promotions would have influenced domestic food consumption, and moreover 
consider how alternative promotion strategies might have affected markets and 
consumption patterns across two food categories in the United States.  Overall, our 
research develops a bridge between economic evaluations of agricultural export 
promotion programs and relevant policy analyses that look at the impacts of consumer 
food choices and consequent health effects. 
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I. Motivation and Objective 
1.1 U.S. Market Development Programs: Policy, History and Critique 
Since the inception of Targeted Export Assistance Program (TEA) in 1985, 
government has begun a decades long effort in subsidizing promotion efforts in the form 
of research, trade shows or advertising campaigns by nonprofit organizations and 
dedicating funds to support small private agribusinesses or farmer cooperatives of their 
farm products in overseas markets. In 1990 the Market Promotion Program (MPP) 
replaced its predecessor, the Market Access Program (MAP), and now serves as the main 
officially funded program in supporting export promotions for high-value agricultural 
products (e.g., fruits, salmon, almonds, wine) in foreign markets (GAO, 1999). With the 
first authorization of this mandatory spending program in 2002 Farm Bill, the promotion 
expenditures in MAP have grown from $120 million in 1997 (GAO, 1999) to nearly $200 
million dollars in 2010 (USDA, 2011). These funds have been employed to raise the 
market share of agricultural goods in the gradually competitive international food 
markets. At the same time, the Foreign Market Development (FMD) program, 
reauthorized by the Agricultural Trade Act in 1978, provides funds, nearly $35 million 
per year between 2005 and 2010 (USDA, 2009), from the U.S. Department of 
Agricultural (USDA) Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to help maintain and expand 
long-term export markets for bulk products (e.g., soybean, cotton, grains, meat, wheat 
rice).  
Total available FY 2011 funding on MAP program is summarized with government 
allocation, from highest to lowest level, on horticultural, non-horticultural and other 
agricultural products in Table 1.1.1 and 1.1.2; around a quarter of the funds goes to 
horticultural products and more 50% of the funds goes to non-horticultural products. 
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Table 1.2 summarizes total available FY 2011 funding on FMD program in terms of 
government allocations, from highest to lowest level, on non-horticultural and other 
agricultural products; more than 50% of the funds goes to non-horticultural products.  
As the whole, total market development spending on U.S. export promotion 
programs has grown by nearly $250 million between 2001 and 2008. Recent studies show 
a positive influence of MAP and FMD on their promotion effectiveness overseas: U.S. 
agricultural exports have increased by $35 for every additional dollar that government 
and industries spend on promotion and market development (Global Insights. 2010). 
Regardless of the substantial economic benefits associated with these export market 
development programs, MAP, especially, has been the target of criticisms that claims it 
provides “corporate welfare” at the expense of domestic taxpayers. It is also purported ot 
benefit the large farmer-owned cooperatives using government funds since its first 
implementation in 1980s. Further opposition against MAP has recently occured in the 
aftermath of national economic downturn and financial crisis. Some have argued that the 
government should be more effective in operating MAP to remedy worsened federal debt 
and rein in wasteful national spending (Shields, 1997; 1999). For the fiscal year 2012 
federal budget, president Obama’s administration proposes “Termination, Reduction and 
Savings” that identifies MAP as a potential spending reduction by 20 percent as it’s 
considered to overlap with other USDA trade promotion programs (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2012). 
1.2 U.S. Fruit and Vegetable Markets: Demand, Promotion and Dietary Implications 
The number of fruits and vegetable servings per capita per day in the United States 
is less its counterpart in other countries with similar level of economic development and 
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relatively homogeneous socioeconomic makeup (Offner, 1999; Burfield, 2003), Richard 
and Patterson (2005) attempted to empirically explain the observed difference between 
fruits and vegetable consumption in the United States and Canada market to provide 
practical policy recommendation for raising current consumption level of fresh produce 
in the United States.  Similar evidences are also found in other developed countries like 
Australia and United Kingdom that broad-based advertising programs for all fruits and 
vegetables have received large-scale public attention and also proved to effectively 
increase domestic consumption of fresh produce (Pollard et al., 2008; Capacci and 
Mazzocchi, 2011). However, in the United States, commodity-specific promotion 
programs instead receive more support at the state or federal level, along with little media 
and official attention paid to broad-based promotions, to promote only certain agricultural 
produce at home.  From an experimental economics approach, Rickard et al. (2011) 
provide more accurate evaluation of certain promotion effort on domestic healthy food 
choices with the consumption of more fruits and vegetables as well as less fat- and sugar-
laden junk food. Their empirical findings support the advertising strategy of multiple-
products promotions since this type of broad-based promotions would not only be 
profitable for domestic producers but also be beneficial to consumers by developing 
individual’s healthier dietary habit in the United States. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Extending the research by Kinnucan and Cai (2010) to consider a two-commodity 
setting, this study examines the economic impact of changes in export promotion 
expenditures by the government for horticultural and non-horticultural products. I 
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evaluate how a change in the level of export promotion subsidy impacts prices, quantities 
consumed and welfare measures in the domestic market.   
In addition to the economic impacts, I also assess the health implications for such a 
change in export promotion subsidies.  Here I focus on changes in caloric consumption 
and nutrient intake, while accounting for the likely cross-product relationships between 
horticultural and non-horticultural products.  Following Alston et al. (2009), I simulate 
the effect of external shocks on the demand for horticultural and non-horticultural 
products and model any second-round effects when the products are assumed to be 
substitutes or complements.  
Bringing together research themes from these earlier studies, the key objective here 
is to study the impacts of export promotion programs for U.S. farm products in the 
domestic market in terms of both the economic and nutritional outcomes. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This paper begins with an overview on export promotion programs and on food 
consumption of fresh produce in the United States. Chapter 2 reviews relevant studies on 
the impacts of export promotion programs, methodologies employed to provide economic 
analysis, and linkages between obesity and domestic food consumption patterns.  
Graphical illustrations for the economics of non-price export promotion program are 
presented in Chapter 3. Next, an equilibrium displacement model and econometric model 
are introduced in Chapter 4 to simulate the welfare and nutritional impacts of change in 
government expenditures for agricultural export promotions. Chapter 5 summarizes 
parameterization results and Chapter 6 concludes with relevant food policy implications 
and future research direction. 
  5 
II.  Literature Review 
2.1 Economic Impacts of U.S. Agriculture Export Promotions 
Extensive research has been done in investigating the promotion effectiveness in 
foreign markets from various evaluation methodologies. Regarding the effect of 
promotions on the competition among products, Comanor and Wilson (1979) surveyed a 
number of studies with a focus on the influence of advertising expenditure on both direct 
and cross-elasticity demands for farm products. They found a positive relationship 
between promotion and price inelasticity. Echoing with this relationship between 
advertising and competition through the application on foreign market promotion with 
specific commodity, the study by Richards et al. (1997) employed Anderson’s iterative 
two-stage estimation method to examine U.S. apple promotion efforts in Singapore and 
the United Kingdom. They suggest that export promotion would be more effective if 
applied to products that are more price-inelastic, or easier to differentiate. Another 
exploration of cost-effectiveness of programs for cotton drew the conclusion that non-
price promotion has an advantage over price subsidy with higher advertising elasticity 
and lower price elasticity of export demand (Kinnucan, et al., 1995). Besides the use of 
demand elasticity as an indicator for the effectiveness measurement of export promotions, 
Rosson, Hamming and Jones (1986) showed the responsiveness of different agricultural 
commodities to foreign market development expenditures with a regression technique. 
They found that apple and tobacco are responsive while the response to the U.S. poultry 
promotions in foreign countries was not different from zero. 
 As the export promotion programs evolved over time, the increase in public 
funding used to promote high-value agricultural crops overseas have ignited a series of 
debates and concerns among Congress members, media and taxpayers. In response to 
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these criticisms and questionings, Halliburton and Henneberry (1995) studied on the 
effectiveness of fund used to promote almonds in the Pacific Rim countries. While 
returns to government ranged from $4 to $9 per dollar of promotion expenditures spent in 
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong, insignificant effects were found for South Korea and 
Singapore. However, such positive evidence was subsequently questioned about the 
estimation of instable promotion elasticity (Kinnucan and Christian, 1997). Another study 
regarding the export performance of U.S. red meat in Asia examines the effectiveness of 
such promotion efforts as well as the optimal reallocation of expenditures across different 
foreign markets using simulation analysis (Le, Kaiser and Tomek, 1998).  Research has 
also been carried out to investigate the economic impacts of export promotions with 
optimality analysis to explore the investment allocation of promotion for California 
raisins in the United Kingdom (Kaiser, Liu and Consignado, 2003) and U.S. rice in the 
world market (Rusmevichientong and Kaiser, 2009). This work adds to the work that 
employs the simulation procedure estimate the magnitude of promotion impacts on 
exports of certain crops. Rules are also developed for optimal allocation of promotion 
expenditures in achieving efficiency goals between markets both domestically and 
overseas (Ding and Kinnucan, 1996) as well as among goods distinguished by countries 
of origin (Goddard and Conboy, 1993).  
As a whole, the research on the effectiveness of export promotion program, in 
terms of export sales and market shares, has been conducted for various agricultural 
products across different regions. However, most of the earlier work has not fully 
examined the distributional issues of benefits from promotion in terms of overall 
economic surplus for various parties. Estimation of the distribution of returns from 
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promotion has been made to broaden the scope of investigating such substantial 
government outlays (Wohlgenant, 1993). Research has explored the benefits from 
advertising for different producer groups selling various but closely related commodities, 
known as beggar-thy-neighbor behavior (Alston, Freebairn and James, 2001) and from 
different countries competing for import markets of certain products, known as free-rider 
effects (Kinnucan and Myrland, 2003).  Above all, these studies focus mostly on 
producer gains from the promotion whereas the simultaneous impacts on consumers are 
rarely addressed. A graphical analysis to illustrate the benefits and costs of advertising by 
a large exporter has been developed to capture accurate welfare measures for both 
producers and consumers (Alston, Carman and Chalfant, 1994). An examination of 
Australia’s wine promotion program also considers the domestic consumer impacts, 
concluding that the domestic consumer loses substantially from the price-raising effect of 
promotion abroad and its impact in reducing supplies on the domestic market (Zhao, 
Anderson and Wittwer, 2003).  More recently, a study thoroughly examines whether the 
subsidy use justifies its original goal in successfully exporting agricultural products by 
taking the domestic consumer welfare into consideration (Kinnucan and Cai, 2010). 
With respect to the methodology, the economic evaluations of promotion efforts are 
often undertaken using comparative static analyses more commonly known as 
equilibrium displacement models (EDM) and used by Alston et al. (1999); Henneberry 
(2009), Wohlgenant (1993), Zhao et al. (2000), Zhao et al. (2003). The structure of a food 
or crop industry is represented by a system of demand and supply equations defining 
equilibria across different markets. The successful promotion campaigns in various 
product markets are modeled as shifts in the relevant supply or demand curves. When 
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exogenous shocks from either demand or supply side displace the equilibrium, the 
resulting price and quantity changes allows changes in quantity consumed in different 
markets. Here I extend the analysis to also consider how simulated changes in quantity 
affect calorie intake and body weight. 
Taken together, to my knowledge, no research has evaluated the impact of export 
promotion program on domestic food consumption and calorie intake. My objective is to 
further identify the linkage between obesity rates, nutrient consumption and promotion 
programs targeting foreign markets.  
2.2 Methodology: Econometric Estimation and Equilibrium Displacement Model 
A number of studies have examined the impacts of U.S. export promotions on 
foreign markets for various commodities and importing countries. Methods in these 
studies are designed to estimate either the demand for U.S. commodities in importing 
countries or the U.S. export demand for commodities. Whether it is the export or import 
demand that is to be specified, the promotion activities are typically included as an 
explanatory variable as a way to characterize the effects of advertising expenditures spent 
on U.S. commodities exports. To effectively identify the impacts of other explanatory 
variables in these demand equations, determinants such as price, income, exchange rates, 
population, domestic production, substitute prices, competitors’ prices, trend variable, 
lagged dependent variable and different trade barrier measures are included. 
Several studies employ the import demand approach for various commodities in 
different regions. The promotion effectiveness of the U.S. red meat exports to Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan had been examined (Le, Kaiser and Tomek, 
1998). The carryover effect of export promotion is incorporated into their single equation 
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model in the form of Cobb-Douglas function. In their model, the per capita imports of red 
meat in U.S. dollars is the independent variable, and they found that only in South Korea 
did both the current and past promotion efforts have significant and positive impacts on 
demand. The sum of current and lagged promotion elasticities was estimated to be 0.598 
for South Korea. In terms of the own-price effect on import sales, the price variables 
denoted for these four countries were all statistically insignificant. 
Another study examined the effectiveness of U.S. non-price promotion of Almonds 
in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (Halliburton and Henneberry, 
1995). They used such various functions and forms (Cobb-Douglas, linear and 
exponential) to estimate the volume of almond imports to these countries in the Pacific 
Rim. They found that while the promotion expenditures played rather insignificant role in 
South Korea and Singapore, export promotions were effective in Japan, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong when the linear functional form was used. Respective promotion elasticities 
ranged from 0.2 to 0.5. Despite these inconclusive results in the estimation of export 
promotions, a consistent relationship between almond prices and import demand was 
found. 
Besides the export promotion efforts, impacts of trade policies such as tariff rates 
and import quota were also incorporated to examine import patterns for U.S. fresh 
grapefruit imports in France, Netherland, Canada and Japan (Fuller, Bello and Capps, 
1992). A linear demand model that treated per capita import volumes as the dependant 
variable demonstrated found a positive impact of promotion spending on import demand 
for U.S. fresh grapefruits by France, Japan and Netherlands (estimated promotion 
elasticities were 0.11, 0.23 and 0.15) at a 10% level of significance.   While the price did 
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not have significant impact on impacts into the Netherlands, the import demand of the 
United States, France and Canada were sensitive to prices. 
The export demand approach is frequently employed to investigate the 
effectiveness of export promotion efforts. An attempt to examine the role of foreign 
market promotion programs for apples, poultry and tobacco was done with the estimation 
of a simple linear regression model (Rossen, Hamming and Jones, 1986). While 
promotion efforts did not significantly raise the total export volumes of poultry, the 
promotion efforts appeared to increase the exports of U.S. apple and tobacco in selected 
European member states. 
Another study examined the impact of selected export promotion programs for U.S. 
orange juice exports to France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom 
(Armah and Epperson, 1997). Their results showed that the promotion efforts by Food 
Marketing Program, Targeted Export Assistance and Market Promotion Program had a 
positive and significant influence on U.S. juice sales in all five foreign markets. 
Additional export volume would have been generated between 0.014% and 0.0302% 
given 1% increase in government promotion expenditures. Also, the own-price variable 
played a significantly negative role in determining the volume of orange juice exported to 
these importing countries. While France, German, Japan, and United Kingdom were less 
responsive to changes in export price, the demand was more elastic for the Netherlands. 
Equilibrium displacement frameworks have been widely used by agricultural 
economists to model the impacts of different external shocks on foreign or domestic 
markets for various agricultural commodities.  
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Some studies emphasized the demand and supply shocks on the U.S. meat sector 
(Wohlgenant, 1993; Alston, Freebairn and James, 2001; Brorsen et al., 2002; Kinnucan, 
2003; Brester, Marsh and Atwood, 2004; Lusk and Anderson, 2004). Specifically for the 
empirical investigation of promotion effectiveness, studies have focused on the beef 
market at home (Kinnucan, Xiao and Hsia, 1996; Coulivaly and Brorsen, 1999) or abroad 
(Henneberry, Mutondo and Brorsen, 2009). Other examined the advantage of non-price 
export promotions over price promotions for the U.S. cotton (Kinnucan, Duffy and 
Ackerman, 1995).  
2.3 Impacts of Food Choices on Body Weight 
It has been widely documented that export promotion programs have spurred the 
economic and political controversies among government, industries and citizens in the 
United States. Here, I attempt to examine both the economic and the health effects of 
trade promotion efforts in the domestic market by assessing effects on food consumption 
patterns. The MAP program is chosen as the focus here as it applies to high value 
specialty crops such as fresh fruits and vegetables (Table 1.1.1 and 1.1.2); the FMD 
program has traditionally applied to bulk agricultural products (Table 1.2).  
Concerns over dietary health are rising as we witness the growing obesity epidemic 
in the United States over the past few decades. The prevalence of obesity has doubled 
(Zhang and Wang, 2004) and exceeded 30% in most sex and age groups (Flegal et al., 
2010). Especially in the recent ten years, the concerns over excessive body weight among 
American adults have received more and more research attention on relevant research 
among different disciplines. The overweight phenomenon has been claimed as key health 
problem facing the United States today (e.g. Mokdad et al., 1999; Mokdad et al., 2001; 
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Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; Townsend, 2006).  Several studies have been carried 
out on the consequences of obesity and its impacts on chronic disease including diabetes, 
hypertension, high cholesterol, stroke, heart disease, cancers and arthritis (Must et al., 
1999; WHO, 2000; Malnick and Knobler, 2006; Flegal et al., 2007). Higher grades of 
obesity are even more likely associated with excess mortality (Orpana, 2009). In terms of 
the social costs, the public health sector faces direct and indirect health care expenses 
estimated to be $78.5 billion in1998 and $ 117 billion in 2000 (Pronk, Tan and O’Connor, 
1999; USDHHS, 2001; Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn and Wang, 2003).    
2.4 Health and Dietary Implications for Proposed Food Policies 
In response to the excessive weight gain as well as the social costs linked to obesity, 
government could play a role in critically identifying policy actions that might reverse the 
obesity trends statewide with effective changes in dietary patterns. To help individuals 
achieve healthy dietary plan, fitness and fat-loss goals in the United States are provided 
that stress an improved quality of diet emphasizing distinctions between nutrient rich and 
energy dense food. The USDA provides a general guide to healthy eating as “the Food 
Pyramid” (Miljkovic, 2006; USDA, 2005), where a standard serving of five major food 
groups consumed in varying proportions is outlined and best visualized as the 
fundamental dietary structure for healthy and balanced living in the long run. The Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans (USDA/DHHS, 2005) is used to advise consumers to seek out 
nutrient rich food to meet nutrient requirement without exceeding daily energy need 
(ADA reports, 2007). Complementary to these campaigns for healthier and more 
nutritious food choices, several recent studies have also tried to develop and define the 
“nutrient density” of food to better communicate this message of balanced diet for 
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reducing obesity to the public (Drewnowski, 2005; Drewnowski, 2009). Contrary to the 
notion of nutrition density, “energy-dense” food has been empirically verified as nutrient-
poor (Darmon et al., 2006), which infers its equivalence to “empty-calorie” food. 
Furthermore, some studies have examined the relationship between the nutritient levels 
and the quality of diet in American adults in support of a healthier dietary attitude 
towards the consumption of more nutrient-dense food in place of energy-dense food 
(Ledikwe et al., 2006).  
From the above messages that target an improvement in diet quality and encourage 
a “more nutritious” pattern of food consumption in the long run, some studies have 
supported the positive effect of high consumption of fruits and vegetables on reducing 
obesity (Neumark-Sztainer et al., 1996; Kahn et al., 1997; Epstein et al., 2001).  The 
analysis of market intervention by government in encouraging this positive effect and 
correcting the market failure of prevalent obesity has also been found in many studies 
(e.g., Cash, Sunding and Zilverman, 2005; Miljkovic, 2006; Schroeter, Lusk and Tyner 
2008). 
We now see a paradigm shift in agricultural policy settings from the state 
intervention level to a more liberalized market environment. This may be partially driven 
by the rising global obesity rate and the “non-communicable” diseases prevalently taking 
place in developing countries. Hawkes, Friel, Lobstein and Lang (2012) test several 
hypothesis to develop feasible policy interventions in helping reorient the consumer’s fat- 
or sugar-dense diets towards healthier eating habits with more intake of fruits, vegetables, 
whole grains and nuts. Given the important finding in this study that the policy changes 
in more globalized agricultural market have impacted both the “healthy” and “unhealthy” 
  14 
foods and ingredients, they recommended that more policy weight should be put on. This 
presents an alternative to the more traditional response of directly intervening in the 
production process to encourage consumers to make healthier food choices, fixing the 
substitution, distribution and marketing process throughout the food supply chains.    
Public debates concerning the linkage between increased obesity rates in the United 
States and the farm subsidies are prevalent. Farm subsidies have also been regarded as 
the main contributor to current obesity epidemic by lowering the price of more energy-
dense food (Nestle, 2002; Tilloston, 2004; Muller, Schoonover and Wallinga, 2007; 
Ludwig and Pollack 2009; Popkin, 2010), while other studies have made paramount 
efforts in identifying the impacts of agricultural policy on commodity prices from an 
opposite standpoint. The small cost share of agricultural commodities in food products, 
cross-country comparisons, (Senauer and Gemma, 2006; Miller and Coble, 2007) the less 
important effect of farm policies on certain ingredient prices (Beghin and Jensen, 2008), 
and the diminishing impact of agricultural subsidies on caloric consumption over time 
(Rickard et al., 2012) all speak for the rather weak or non-existent influence of 
agricultural policies on the growth in U.S. obesity rates. Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro 
(2003) proposed and empirically tested several theories that attributed the rise in 
countrywide obesity to the increase in caloric intake. However, despite the abundant 
literature examining the relationships between agricultural policies and the rising obesity 
rates in the United States, efforts that attempt to explore the potential spill-over effects of 
export promotion programs on the price, consumption and calorie intake level of selected 
farm commodities are rarely invested.  
2.5 Bridging the Gap: Trade Promotions and Dietary Intake      
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As a whole, respective efforts have been put in either thoroughly measuring the 
effects of U.S. trade promotions or in accurately capturing the proposed policy changes 
on domestic dietary choices in United States. Alston, Chalfant and Piggott (2000) 
attempted to incorporate the consumer welfare measure to complete the welfare 
economic analysis of promotional activities while they focus only on the domestic beef 
market in the United States.  Work by Kinnucan and Cai (2010) has further pushed the 
frontier of promotion evaluations to investigate whether the USDA-operated promotion 
programs optimize the overall social welfare as the responses of domestic consumers to 
subsidy changes are considered.  
Here I develop a bridge between economic evaluations of agricultural promotion 
programs and policy analyses that examine the impacts of consumer food choices and 
consequent health effects. I extend the line of this most updated research on promotion 
effectiveness to examine the market effects of changes in trade promotion expenditures 
on domestic market and consumers by incorporating consequent changes in prices, 
quantities and calorie intake across different food categories. Particularly for the 
horticultural product group composed of fruits and vegetables, higher consumption share 
of such “nutrient-dense” food is considered to help alleviate overweight phenomenon that 
has become increasingly common among American adults.   
Similar to what had been done by Alston et al. (2009) that explores the linkage of 
policy changes on food choices, this study employs a equilibrium displacement model to 
capture the potential externality of U.S. export promotion efforts on domestic dietary 
choices and the relevant caloric impacts by considering both domestic and export markets, 
and two groups of agricultural commodities!horticultural and non-horticultural products. 
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III. Conceptual Framework for Examining Trade Promotions 
3.1 Overview   
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the basic economics of non-price export 
promotion in a partial equilibrium setting.  Here we assume that the United States 
accounts for a sufficiently large portion of world trade to affect price, i.e., it is facing a 
downward-sloping excess demand,ED , curve. In the context of both domestic and export 
markets, consumption choices are composed of the following two food groups: 
horticultural (denoted with subscript ) and non-horticultural (denoted with subscript ) 
products. The change in government expenditures for export promotions on all the farm 
products would shift the export demand of horticultural and non-horticultural products 
either inward or outward, simultaneously, further imposing consequent market impacts 
on domestic consumers.  
When government increases its promotional expenditures for agricultural products, 
the domestic market is affected in two ways. First, a subsidy-induced outward-shift in 
export demand raises the domestic market price with a corresponding decrease in 
quantities consumed at home. Second, when export subsidy increases, given that the extra 
export demand does not enlarge the overall budget for agricultural promotions, the 
domestic demand is reduced as funds are diverted from promotional efforts in the 
domestic market to capture the subsidy, known as a “cannibalization effect” (Kinnucan 
and Cai, 2010).   
When government decreases its promotional expenditures for agricultural products, 
a subsidy-induced inward-shift in export demand first lowers domestic market price, and 
this is followed by a corresponding increase in domestic consumption. Moreover, the 
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reinvest its domestic promotional efforts on both horticultural and non-horticultural 
products. Thus, domestic demand rises in response to such subsidy-induced reallocation 
of advertising expenditures, identified here as a “subsidy-redirection effect”. 
Given a decrease in the export subsidy, Figure 3.1 illustrates the markets effects of 
an increase in government expenditure for export promotions in both domestic and 
foreign markets. Figure 3.2 presents the effects of the reduced government spending in 
agricultural trade promotions.  In respect of corresponding market impacts, Figure 3.1 
and 3.2 illustrates the role of “cannibalization effect” and “subsidy-redirection effect” in 
the domestic market imposed by the change in government expenditure for export 
promotions.  
3.2 Increase in Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions— 
      Role of Cannibalization Effect   
       Figure 3.1 illustrates the economics of U.S. non-price export promotions, from an 
increased-subsidy perspective, for agricultural products in both domestic and export 
market. To allow for a more general consideration, commodity C is used to denote 
“crops” and, for the purpose of expositions, includes horticultural and non-horticultural 
products. Likely Impacts induced by subsidy increase both in the absence of and in the 
presence of cannibalization effect are explored in the following.   
In the absence of “Cannibalization Effect”         
         Panel A in Figure 3.1 shows the effect of an increase in government expenditures 
for export promotions when the cannibalization effect in domestic market is ignored. The 
excess demand in export market increases from  to , causing the equilibrium 
market price to increase from to  and domestic consumption level to decrease from 
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to , assuming the increase in export subsidy has not impacted the domestic market, 
as it has shifted the export demand outward. 
In the Presence of “Cannibalization Effect”  
         Panel B in Figure 3.1 shows the effect of an increase in government expenditure for 
export promotions when the cannibalization effect in domestic market is considered. In 
this case, the domestic demand shifts inward from  to  as levy-constrained industry 
monies are diverted from domestic to foreign promotions to meet the cost-share 
requirement of government allocations for promotional efforts on the export of farm 
products. In response, the total supply for the foreign market has thus increased with an 
downward shift of excess supply from  to ; thus now intersects with subsidy-
induced  to generate a new equilibrium market price at and domestic quantities 
consumed at , respectively below the original market equilibrium level at and .  
3.3 Decrease in Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions— 
      Role of Reallocation Effect 
        Adopting similar logic that was used in previous section, here I characterize the economics 
of non-price promotions and the economy-wide effects of U.S. agricultural export promotions for 
both domestic and export markets from a decrease-promotion effort. To allow for a more general 
consideration in Figure 4, denotation C is still used to indicate “crops” and includes horticultural 
and non-horticultural products. Here I use H and N to indicate horticultural and non-horticultural 
markets, respectively. Likely Impacts induced by subsidy decrease both in the absence of and in 
the presence of reallocation effect are explored in the following. 
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In the Absence of “Reallocation” Effect  
         Panel A in Figure 3.2 shows the effect of a decrease in government expenditures for 
export promotions when the reallocation effect in the domestic market is ignored. The 
excess demand in the export market decreases from  to , causing the equilibrium 
market price to decrease from to  and domestic consumption level to increase from 
to . In this analysis, I assume that the decrease in export subsidy has not impacted 
the domestic market, as it has shifted inward the export demand. The lower price confers 
a welfare gain to consumers equal to hatched area while a welfare loss to 
producers equal to the shaded area . With the shaded area exceeding the hatched 
area, there is an unambiguous gross national welfare loss equal to trapezoid . 
Whether the net national welfare loss is negative or positive depends on the amount of 
the reduction in spending on the promotional efforts.  
In the Presence of “Reallocation” Effect 
In Figure 3.2 I also show the effect of a decrease in government expenditures for 
export promotions when the reallocation effect in domestic market is considered (see 
Panel B). In this case, the domestic demand shifts outward from  to  as industry 
dollars are reallocated from foreign to domestic promotions in response to the reduced 
government funding for promotional efforts on the exports of farm products. Therefore, 
the total supply for foreign markets decreased with an upward shift of excess supply 
curve from  to . This intersects with the subsidy-induced  to generate a new 
equilibrium market price at and domestic quantities consumed at . The original 
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market equilibrium level occurs at ,  and takes place when the reallocation effect is 
not accounted for in the domestic market.  
As it comes to welfare implications for non-price export promotions, for one thing, 
with a rather smaller price effect induced by the decreased subsidy taking place in Panel 
B, the producer welfare loss shrinks. Specifically, there is a bigger area in Panel A 
than the area  in Panel B.  In comparison, ignoring the consequent impact on 
domestic market inappropriately allows for an overstatement of producer loss, 
represented by a quantifiable area . 
In addition, the implication of a reduction in subsidies for export promotion will 
impact consumer welfare differently depending on whether promotion is persuasive, 
informative or it further induces the change in purchasing behavior (Tremblay and 
Tremblay, 1995). Maximal consumer impact results in the consumer welfare gain from 
subsidy-induced increase in domestic demand equals the area  (summation of 
amount equal to rectangular  and to triangle ) in Panel B. In this case, the loss 
to society as a whole is ambiguous since there is no certain assertion that the area 
quantifying producer loss exceeds its counterpart quantifying consumer gain in Panel B. 
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IV.  Methods and Quantitative Framework  
4.1 Research Design 
           To quantify the multi-market model of supply and demand for horticultural and 
non-horticultural products presented in Section Three, a conceptual model is introduced 
next. Adopting the similar simulation approach employed by Alston, Norton and Pardey 
(1995), Alston et al. (2009) and Rickard (2012), the base model and its logarithmic 
differential form are developed with a full set of equations in terms of the proportional 
change, elasticity of supply, demand and promotions, and various promotional shares.  
Algebraic solutions for percentage change in price, quantities, and promotional 
expenditures, in response to the change in government funding for export promotions, are 
then derived.  Furthermore, to parameterize the model, export demand for both 
horticultural and non-horticultural products are specified to estimate the price and 
promotional elasticities. In addition, other parameters are collected from existing data 
source provided by government and previous studies. 
4.2 Conceptual Model   
The following partial-equilibrium model is developed to quantify our multi-market 
model for two types of commodities. The main effects from potential changes in 
promotional expenditures as calculated based on information for several key parameters, 
such as promotional elasticities, demand elasticity and cross-price-elasticities in deriving 
price and quantity change while net farm value and the value of domestic consumption in 
deriving economic surplus levels. Supply and demand equations for each of the two 
categories of food are included in the following model where each demand is further 
disaggregated into the demand in both export and domestic market. 
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Upper-right subscripts  and  differentiate between horticultural and non-
horticultural products and lower-right subscripts  and between domestic and export 
market. Endogenous market-level variables include  and  which are the quantities 
consumed at the home market;  and  are the quantities exported to the foreign 
market;  and  are denoted as domestic production;  and  are market prices 
exclusive of the per unit marketing fee  and , hereafter referred to as “supply 
price”, while  and indicate the “demand price” inclusive of marketing fee. For 
other endogenous variables characterizing promotion expenditures,  and  are funds 
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for promotion generated through marketing fee,  and ;  and  are the industry 
expenditures on domestic promotions;  and  are the expenditures for export market 
promotion exclusive of the subsidy;  and  are total expenditures for the export 
market promotion inclusive of the subsidy. Demand shifters include and  which 
are export “subsidy” for horticultural and non-horticultural products, respectively.            
The first four equations (1a), (1b), (1c) and (1d) describe the demand for 
horticultural and non-horticultural products in domestic and export market, respectively, 
where cross-price effects are considered only in the domestic market. Equations (1e) and 
(1f) show the industry promotional budget composed of expenditures for domestic and 
export promotions. Equations (1g) and (1h) show industry funding for promotions raised 
from marketing fees. Equations (1i), (1j), (1k) and (1l) indicate that total export 
promotional expenditures are composed of government funding and industry investment, 
and are exclusive of subsidy. Government expenditures for export promotions are a 
function of total promotional expenditures for agricultural exports inclusive of the 
subsidy. Equation (1n) and (1o) represent the supply equations for horticultural and non-
horticultural products. The remaining equations, (1m), (1p), (1q), (1r) and (1s) identify 
the market-clearing conditions for market price, quantities consumers and total subsidy 
allocated between horticultural and non-horticultural products. 
In this model, we relax the assumption of fixed domestic supply but otherwise 
maintain the same assumptions used in the graphical analysis in Chapter 3. The model 
here contains eighteen endogenous variables: 6 quantities, 4 prices, 8 advertising levels. 
Also, 5 exogenous variables are included: 2 marketing fees and 3 subsidy levels. 
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Demand for the industry’s output can be increased with  and  from the 
enlarged total funds spent by the government on export promotion. Emphasis in the study 
is put on the effect of an increase in , further spread between  and , on food 
prices, domestic consumption, economic surplus, and caloric and nutrient-intake level 
given changes in export promotion subsidies. 
4.3 Simulation Framework 
         Before converting the conceptual model to percentage changes, equation (1i) is 
substituted into (1e) to eliminate  and equation (1j) is substituted into (1f) to eliminate 
.  Then the logarithmic transformation of the model was developed to establish the 
following system of equations that consider percentage changes in selected variables. 
From equation (2a) to (2s), the  variable indicate relative changes (e.g., 
 ).  These seventeen equations could be solved for following percentage 
changes in ten endogenous variables—four quantities consumed , two 
quantities supplied , and four prices . These variables are 
functions of parameters representing the extent of exogenous variables shock at the 
market level in terms of promotion elasticity for two commodities given both domestic 
and export demand , supply elasticity , own-and cross-price 
elasticity , share of domestic production of horticultural 
 and non-horticultural products  
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sold in the domestic and export market, and marketing fee expressed as the fraction of 
demand price .  
 
For share identities:  represent the 
promotional share for horticultural products where  is total promotional 
budgets for horticultural products. While 
 is the promotional share for non-
horticultural products where  is the total promotional budget for non-
horticultural products. The elasticity indicating the sensitivity of total spending on export 
  26 
promotion for two commodities is represented by ; the respective funding level 
subsidized by the government is also known as the “budget-diversion” elasticity.  
          To determine the effect of change in promotion on the net price received by 
suppliers of horticultural and non-horticultural products,  and  are set equal 
to zero given the ignorable effect of marketing fee. Also, equation (2e), (2f), (2g), (2h), 
(2k), (2l) are deleted to treat expenditure for horticultural promotions  and for 
non-horticultural promotions , as temporarily exogenous. 







Substitution of these results into equations (2a), (2b), (2c), (2d) yield the corresponding 
changes in quantities. From above solution, export promotion’s ability to either raise or 
lower the supply price of two food groups, in its algebraic form, is the function of the 
percentage changes in four promotional expenditure variables 
. These are directly related to export  and 
(3b) 
(3a) 
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domestic  promotional elasticity, and domestic  and export  
quantity shares, simultaneously in both horticultural and non-horticultural market.  All 
the relevant definitions and baseline values for model parameters can be found in Table 
4.1. 
4.4 Subsidy-Induced Effect in Domestic Market 
The Quantitative expression for the subsidy-induced effect in domestic market is 
known as the cannibalization effect in response to increased subsidy or the reallocation 
effect in response to decreased subsidy. These can be obtained for horticultural products, 
in the first place, by dividing equation (3a) through  (assuming government export 
expenditures for non-horticultural promotions do not impact the level of overall and 
industry domestic expenditures for horticultural promotions, or no “cross-product” effects 
take place) with the replacement of equation (2k) to yield:  
 
 
Second, the subsidy-induced effect in domestic non-horticultural products could be 
expressed by dividing (3b) through  (assuming government export expenditures 
for horticultural promotions do not impact the level of overall and industry domestic 
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In either case,  and  are employed to indicate “cannibalization elasticity” or 
“reallocation elasticity” (expected to be negative), based on the direction of change in 
government expenditures for export promotions on respective horticultural and non-
horticultural products.  At the same time the “budget-diversion” elasticities,  and , 
are instead expected to be positive. The sign of equation (4a) and (4b) is ambiguous: 
depending upon the relative magnitude of the induced “inward-shift” in domestic demand 
(increase in government expenditure for export promotions resulting in a reduction in 
domestic demand as promotion funds are diverted to capture the subsidy constraints) or 
of induced “outward-shift” in domestic demand (decrease in government expenditure for 
export promotions resulting in a rise in domestic demand as promotion funds are 
reallocated for the purpose of expanding private investment in the domestic market). In 
this regard, the effect of any given change in subsidy on net producer price could be 
perverse.      
To solve for the percentage change in supply price (in response to subsidy change), 
I need to develop quantitative expressions for these elasticity that characterize the 
sensitivity of domestic promotional expenditures to changes in subsidies for both 
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The effect of change in subsidies applied to domestic market promotions for horticultural 
and non-horticultural products therefore depends on two opposing forces: “budget-
expansion effect” as measured by  and , plus the “budget-diversion 
effect” measured by  and .  
Converting equation (6a) to an elasticity form using equation (15) yields:  
 
 
The cannibalization or reallocation elasticity of horticultural products can be described as:  
 
Converting equation (6b) to an elasticity form with using equation (15)  
 
The cannibalization or reallocation elasticity of non-horticultural products can be described as:  
 
 
 Thus, the cannibalization or reallocation elasticity,  and ,  equals a positive 
constant plus a weighted average of budget-expansion, ,  and budget-diversion 
 elasticities. Also, the proportional change in producer price and the 
cannibalization/reallocation effects are the function of one another, thus equation (8a) and 













Given baseline values for promotional elasticity, demand elasticity, budget-
diversion elasticity, budget share and quantities share, equation (9a) and (9b) are then 
employed to quantify the price effect for domestic horticultural and non-horticultural 
products.  
4.5 Econometric Model—Estimation of Export Demand and Export Promotion 
 Two export demand models are specified to generate estimates for export demand 
elasticity and export promotional elasticity of horticultural and non-horticultural 
products. Available time-series data, from 1975 to 2004, contain export values (USDA, 
GATS), unit-value of horticultural and poultry products (USDA, GATS), real trade-
weighted exchange rates for competitors’ exports of horticultural and non-horticultural 
products and the export promotional expenditures for high-value agricultural products, 
denoted as HVP by Kinnucan and Cai (2010). Since HVP is composed of horticultural, 
non-horticultural, and other intermediate products, export promotional expenditures for 
horticultural and non-horticultural products can be approximated by multiplying the total 
promotional expenditures on HVP exports with the export share of horticultural and non-
(9a) 
(9b) 
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horticultural products (dividing export values of horticultural and non-horticultural 
products by the values of total HVP exports), respectively. Following a similar empirical 
model specification employed by Kinnucan and Cai (2010), I estimate: 
 
Where is the dependent variable characterized by the foreign market-share of 
U.S. agricultural exports, where is the nominal value of U.S. agricultural export in 
year in U.S. dollars and is the nominal value of world imports of agricultural 
products in year in U.S. dollars; this replaces the real foreign income in order to convert 
the model into a conditional demand specification by (Phillips, 1990; Kinnucan and Cai, 
2010). In the model,  is the unit value of U.S. bulk agricultural exports in year in 
U.S. dollars, serving as a proxy for the U.S. price;  is the GNP deflator for the 
world less the United States; is the stone index of real trade-weighted exchange rates 
that reflects the price of U.S. competitors’ agricultural exports, serving as proxy for the 
substitute price;  is a world U.S. agricultural trade-weighted real exchange rate;  
is the goodwill variable equal to , in which 
 is the real U.S export promotion expenditures in year  and the 
retention parameter, , is set equal to 0.33 in equation (10), implying a contribution of 
less than 11% to the current stock of goodwill from the advertising expenditures older 
than two years. In addition,  is the special drawing rights, describing the values of 
U.S. dollars in relation to a market basket of five world currencies; this information is 
(10) 
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provided by International Monetary Fund. A linear trend variable is indicated by 
 and an error term by .   
However, for the empirical export demand estimated in this study, instead of 
following conditional model approach by Kinnucan and Cai (2010) in specifying the 
dependent variable as the share of foreign income spend on U.S. exports, the real foreign 
income variable, represented by real per capita GDP for World less US (in US dollars), is 
instead employed on both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the demand 
equation. In addition, I drop the trend variable. The goodwill variable is measured by the 
contribution of past advertising (traced back to three years) to the current stock of 
goodwill and adopts a retention parameter of 0.33.  Specification of the export demand 
for horticultural and non-horticultural products is developed next. The empirical model 
used to estimate horticultural demand is: 
 
The empirical model used to estimate non-horticultural export demand is: 
 
In the above econometric specifications:  represents the nominal value of 
U.S. horticultural and non-horticultural exports in year in U.S. dollars (USDA, GATS); 
 is the nominal per capita GDP for world less the United States in year  in U.S. 
dollars (Kinnucan and Cai, 2010);  is the unit value of U.S. horticultural exports in 
U.S. dollars per metric ton (USDA, GATS);  is the unit value of exports on U.S. 
poultry products, serving as a proxy for the price of U.S. non-horticultural products 
(10a) 
(10b) 
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(USDA, GATS);  are real trade-weighted exchange rates for U.S. competitors' 
horticultural exports, serving as a proxy for the price of the substitute for horticultural 
products (USDA: ERS, Agricultural Exchange Rate Data Set);  are real trade-
weighted exchange rates for U.S. competitors’ exports of high-value processed products, 
serving as a proxy for the price of the substitute for non-horticultural products (USDA: 
ERS, Agricultural Exchange Rate Data Set);  is the lagged dependent variable 
for the share of foreign income spent on U.S. horticultural exports;  is the 
lagged dependent variable for the share of foreign income spent on U.S. non-horticultural 
exports. The term  is the GNP deflator for the world less the United States in year 
(Kinnucan and Cai, 2010);  is a world U.S. agricultural trade-weighted real 
exchange rates (Kinnucan and Cai, 2010), included to test whether foreign buyer’s 
response to exchange-rate movements differ from their response to price movements 
(Chambers and Just 1981);  are random disturbance terms in respective export 
demand equation.  
The goodwill variable generated by the export promotion expenditures, allowing 
for the depreciation of advertising over time, in equation (10a) and (10b) follows the 
specification by Nerlove and Arrow (1962). In equation (10a), the goodwill variable for 
horticultural products is defined as , where 
 is the real total U.S. promotion expenditures for horticultural 
exports in year . While the goodwill variable for non-horticultural products is defined as 
 in equation (10b), where 
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 is the real total U.S. promotion expenditures for non-
horticultural exports. In this study the retention parameter, , is set to 0.33 for both 
product groups. Therefore,  implies that the advertising expenditures on 
horticultural exports older than three years contribute less than 11% to the current stock 
of goodwill while implies that the advertising expenditures on non-horticultural 
exports older than three years contribute less than 11% to the current stock of goodwill. 
Equation (10a) and (10b) are further labeled as Model A. One additional more 
restrictive model is also introduced to test the sensitivity of parameter estimates to 
economic hypothesis: 
Model B:  
(homothetic preferences and unitary demand elasticity) 
In testing the constrained Model B, Model A is treated as maintained hypothesis. The 
estimation procedure uses the annual data from 1975 to 2004. Three observations are lost 
because of the goodwill specification, the effective sample period thus ranges from 1978 
to 2004. 
Ordinary least squares is employed in the estimation of horticultural and non-
horticultural export demand. Estimation results are summarized in Table 4.1; I find 
statistically significant coefficients for (with the correct sign) the key variables. A F-test 
turns out to not reject Model B for both products (Table 4.1, last row). Since Model A 
and Model B are statistically equivalently, following discussion will focus on rather 
simple specification. 
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In Model A and Model B, the estimated coefficients of lagged dependent variables 
are all significant for both products (t-ratio > 9 for horticultural exports; t-ratio > 4 for 
non-horticultural exports), rejecting the static specification in the two export demand 
estimations. In Model B, given the unitary demand elasticity constraints, market shares of 
horticultural and non-horticultural products are shown to be invariant to the U.S. price of 
horticultural and poultry products. The short-run own-price elasticities of both products 
are thus equal to -1.  Dividing these coefficients by one minus the estimated coefficients 
of lagged dependent variables (0.6844 in horticultural export demand; 0.4346 in non-
horticultural export demand) yields the long-run export demand elasticity of -3.584 for 
horticultural products and of -2.304 for non-horticultural products. Hence, both export 
demand for U.S. horticultural and non-horticultural products appears to be price elastic, 
falling within the estimates provided by Kinnucan and Cai (2010) of -3.57.  The long-run 
export promotional elasticities, represented by the coefficient of goodwill variables, for 
both products are derived from dividing the short-run elasticity by one minus the 
estimated lagged dependent variables (0.273 for horticultural products; 0.105 for non-
horticultural products).  
Given the important role the coefficients of two key variables, own-price and 
goodwill, play in the subsequent simulation process, I further test whether any 
observation has a major impact on the magnitudes of key slope coefficients. Partial-
regression leverage plots are therefore employed.  Leverage plots for all the independent 
variables showed an influential data point in year 1980 for horticultural export demand 
estimations and another influential data point in year 1988 for non-horticultural export 
demand estimations. When these two observations are respectively dropped,  the 
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coefficients for key variables become more significant and larger in absolute value for 
both products (see Table 4.2).  In a constrained horticultural demand model, indicated by 
Model B, dropping the observation in 1980 leads to a slightly less elastic export demand 
of -3.46 and an export promotional elasticity of 0.282. In a constrained non-horticultural 
demand model, dropping the observation in 1988 results in the slightly less elastic export 
demand of -2.48 and an export promotional elasticity of 0.12.  Therefore, the adjusted 
coefficients are employed in simulation model to better capture the responsiveness of 
consumers in foreign markets to market price and U.S. export promotions. 
Compared with previous studies that examined the effect of USDA-sponsored non-
price export promotion programs on export demand, the export promotional elasticity 
estimated here are reasonable. The estimated value for horticultural products is 0.272 and 
for non-horticultural products it is 0.106; these do not deviate far from the range of 
elasticities estimated by Kinnucan and Cai (2010). My estimates for export promotional 
elasticity of horticultural products are larger than the estimates obtained by Dwyer (1994) 
and the two reports by Global Insight (2007, 2010) while the estimate for export 
promotional elasticity of non-horticultural products are smaller than previous relevant 
studies. Implications from these estimates are that a 1% increase in export promotion 
expenditures is expected to increase the demand for horticultural products by 0.11% and 
for non-horticultural products by 0.27%.  
In another estimation procedure, I attempt to derive the budget-diversion elasticity, 
, by regressing the logarithm of total export promotion expenditures on the 
logarithm of government expenditure using annual data from 1975 to 2004 (Kinnucan 
and Cai, 2012) for horticultural products in equation (11a)  
(11a) 
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and for non-horticultural products in equation (11b).  
 
Here  is estimated to be 0.887 (with t-value of 29.32 and adj. R-squared of 0.967), 
serving as an estimate for the budget-diversion elasticity of horticultural product, . 
While  is estimated to be 0.873 (with t-value of 27.83 and adj. R-squared of 0.964), 
serving as an estimate for the budget-diversion elasticity of non-horticultural product, .  
4.6 Welfare Measure 
          Welfare effects induced by changes in government expenditures for export 
promotions on horticultural and non-horticultural products can be calculated as follows. 
Here we adopt the formula presented by Wohlgenant (1993), but also allow for a multi-
market setting considering two types of food commodities. It also allows for potential 
impacts on domestic taxpayers, where the amount  of change in taxpayer surplus is 
equivalently measured by the change in government expenditures for export promotions. 
When government increases its funding level with collected tax revenues, taxpayer 
surplus decreases while if subsidy is reduced, the national budget is thus enlarged.   
Producer Surplus Measure 
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Total Welfare Impact 
 
In domestic horticultural and non-horticultural markets, above , 
,  and  are corresponding changes in domestic 
producer, consumer, taxpayer and social surplus associated with changes in government 
expenditures for export promotions. The net (of marketing fee) value of farm products in 
initial equilibrium before any external shock has shifted domestic demand is 
; indicates domestic consumer expenditures on horticultural 
and non-horticultural products in initial equilibrium;  are 
percentage changes in producer and market price while are 
percentage changes in domestic production and consumption level in response to changes 
in government expenditures for export promotions. The relative vertical shift in domestic 
demand curve caused by change in export subsidies is , where  and 
 implies subsidy increase while and  implies subsidy decrease; and 
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Vertical shift parameters are obtained by solving equation (2a) and (2b) for 
 with  set to zero to yield  and . 
Relative change in demand price holding domestic consumption is fixed:  
 and  . Its absolute 
value,  and  , measures the relative vertical distance between and  in Figure 
4, Panel B, where subscript  represents both horticultural and non-horticultural 
products. I set  in this study, in which the value of 1 in the 
consumer welfare measure proposed by Wohlgenant (1993) to examine the lower-bound, 
middle-bound and upper-bound level of impacts of advertising would have imposed on 
domestic consumers.  
4.7 Model Calibration 
Table 4.3 presents the baseline values and data sources for the simulation model 
parameters. Initial equilibrium values for price, quantity and promotion are set to their 
average annual average from 2000 to 2004.  Budget share parameters for both products 
are derived from the available dataset of U.S. government expenditure for export 
promotion, total U.S. expenditures for export promotion and industry investments on 
promotions. Likewise, the quantity shares are derived from the data made available by 
government sources on average gross value of U.S. farm production for horticultural and 
non-horticultural products and respective average export values for these two food groups 
in the United States, in year 2000-04 (USDA, GATS).  Given the nominal values of 
agricultural exports across different food groups, value of domestic consumption is then 
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derived by deducting export values from gross values of total farm production.  
Marketing fees for horticultural and non-horticultural products, serving as a fraction of 
demand price, were derived by dividing industry promotional dollars by total gross value 
of farm output across the two food categories so as to generate the net farm value of U.S. 
farm production. 
Supply elasticity for both horticultural and non-horticultural products are set to 0.6. 
The export demand parameters for horticultural and non-horticultural products,  
and  are estimated in this study. However, both own-and cross-price 
elasticity for these two commodity groups are borrowed from 
published estimates in previous studies while promotional elasticities  are set 
within a reasonable range, consistent with earlier work (Richards, 1999; Kinnucan and 
Zheng, 2005).  
Domestic promotion elasticity is assumed to lie between 0 and 0.1 for non-
horticultural products. It is consistent with empirical estimates of domestic promotional 
spending on such commodities that constitute bulk and some processed HVP products 
such as dairy, beef, pork and cotton (Kinnucan and Zheng, 2005). These turn out to 
account for a major proportion of the non-horticultural product group categorized in this 
study.  However, for horticultural products, a different interval between 0 and 0.2 is 
adopted. It is consistent with the estimate of domestic promotional elasticity for fresh 
fruits by Richards (1999). Moreover, the subsidy-induced effect on the domestic 
horticultural and non-horticultural markets, given a cannibalization effect or the 
reallocation effect in face of decrease in public funding level, is “turned off” by setting 
  41 
 in equation (4a) for horticultural products and by setting  in equation (4b) 
for non-horticultural products. 
             In Table 4.4, I summarize the published domestic own-price and cross-price 
elasticity for horticultural products; Table 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 summarize for non-
horticultural products. For the purpose of this study, the own-price elasticity of meat or 
beef in domestic market (Richards et al., 2005; Andreyeva et al., 2008) is used to 
represent  for non-horticultural products in our simulation model while the own-price 
elasticity of fresh fruits in domestic market (Huang and Lin, 2000; Rickard et al., 2012) is 
used to represent the  for horticultural products.  
Regarding cross-price elasticity, we use the apples as the representative of 
horticultural products, as it has received highest amount of government funding among 
horticultural products in its promotional efforts in foreign markets under MAP program 
in FY 2011, indicated by Table 1) and beef (representative of non-horticultural products 
as it has received highest amount of government funding among non-horticultural 
products in its promotional efforts in foreign markets under MAP program in FY 2011, 
indicated by Table 2) to identify the substitution effect between horticultural and non-
horticultural commodities (Huang, 1986).   
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V. Results 
5.1 Baseline Assumptions and an Outline of Simulation Scenarios  
I set a 10% change in government expenditure for export promotions of agricultural 
products and apply baseline values of model parameters, from Table 4. Equation (9a) and 
(9b) generates the corresponding price changes and the percentage change in domestic 
consumption with the substitution of subsidy-induced price effect into equation (2a) and 
(2b). The next step uses simulated values for endogenous variables (market price, 
quantities consumed, and promotional expenditures) from the equilibrium displacement 
model to calculate welfare changes. Equations (12a)-(15b) are used to quantify the 
consequent welfare impact, in terms of surplus changes facing producer, consumer, 
taxpayer and society as a whole induced by the proposed changes in government funding 
on agricultural export promotions. 
Next I develop a link between changes in export subsidy expenditures and both 
caloric and nutrient intake levels. To provide a quantitative examination of dietary 
impacts that changes in export subsidies would have imposed on domestic consumers, I 
first calculate the caloric and nutrient-intake level per capita per day contributed from 
major horticultural and non-horticultural food groups (summarized in Table 5.1). The 
proportional changes in domestic consumption are used to generate absolute changes in 
the yearly caloric-and nutrient-intake level per capita at home.  Relative change (in 
percentage form) in the intake level of selected macro- and micro-nutrients per capita are 
also derived by dividing the absolute changes in yearly intake by average yearly intake 
level for respective nutrients, where the yearly nutrient-intake level is calculated by 
multiplying the daily intake level per capita of nutrients of U.S. food supply (USDA, 
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ERS: Food Availability Data System) by 365 days per year. Here I assume that 3500 
calories equals 1 pounds (Hall and Jordan, 2008; Hall et al., 2011) to measure the 
associated weight changes. 
Six assumptions on key parameter values are used here in the simulations. First, an 
inelastic supply curve for domestic horticultural and non-horticultural market in the long 
run is assumed of .  Second, domestic demand for horticultural 
products, , is assumed to be more elastic than for non-horticultural products, 
. Third, various levels of promotional impacts on domestic consumer 
welfare are applied for both horticultural and non-horticultural promotions with equal 
weight of . Fourth, symmetric cross-price elasticity of domestic 
demand for these two types of commodities is held for three product relationships, 
independent , substitution  and complementary 
.  Fifth, the effect of changes in government expenditures for export 
promotions on domestic consumers, known as “cannibalization effect” induced by 
increase in export subsidy and a “reallocation effect” induced by decrease in export 
subsidy, could be turned off to emphasize the absence of such effects. This is done by 
setting domestic promotional elasticity of horticultural product equal to zero, , in 
equation (4a) (Chapter 4.4) and by setting domestic promotional elasticity of non-
horticultural product equal to zero, , in equation (4b) (Chapter 4.4). That is, 
characterization of either cannibalization or reallocation effects, , captures the 
sensitivity of domestic promotional expenditure to changes in government expenditures 
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for export promotions on horticultural and non-horticultural products.  An assumption of 
assigning the values for both domestic promotional elasticity of these two commodity 
groups to zero would have thus muted such responsiveness.   
The sixth assumption addresses the level of changes in government expenditures 
for export promotions. Generally, total government allocations on agricultural exports are 
composed of four types of promotional expenditures for various product groups as 
horticultural products, non-horticultural products,  bulk products and non-food high-value 
products:   
 
Where AG represent the government promotion expenditures for all the agricultural 
products, AG
h
 for horticultural products, AG
n
 for non-horticultural products, AG
b
 for bulk 
products, and AG
nf
 for non-food high-value products. Since this study focuses on the 
welfare and nutritional implications from agricultural export promotions, I only consider 
the major food groups of horticultural products (fresh and processed fruits & vegetables; 
tree nuts) and non-horticultural products (Meat, poultry and fish; dairy product and eggs; 
fats and oils; grain products; sugars and sweeteners; alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages); bulk products (wheat; coarse grains; rice; soybeans; cotton; tobacco; pulses; 
peanuts) and other intermediate products (flour; feed and fodders; live animals; hides and 
skins; planting seeds) are accounted at this point to quantify their dietary contributions on 
caloric- and nutrient-intake level per capita per day. Thus, we combine the bulk and 
remaining agricultural products into other agricultural products, denoted as AG
o
, by 
inserting equation .  Thus (16) could be rearranged into 
(16) 
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Taking logarithmic differential yields: 
 
Average annual data from 2000-04 indicates that export promotion expenditures for 
high-value products was $79 million; more specific product-oriented support from 
government in foreign markets on horticultural promotions was $26 million and non-
horticultural promotions was $36 million. Promotions for intermediate goods was $17 
million and was derived by multiplying total support on high-value promotions with 
respective export value shares of horticultural, non-horticultural and intermediate 
products out of total high-value exports. Adding government expenditures on export 
promotions for bulk products of $52 million to the export subsidy on intermediate 
products of $17 million provides an approximate measure for promotional allocations on 
the export of other agricultural products from the public sector, total $69 million.   
The  Market Access Program covers most of the high-value products while Foreign 
Market Development Programs covers both the bulk and non-horticultural products, 
along with a significant subsidy share of other agricultural products at the level of 53%. 
To extend economic analysis to consider dietary perspective from changes in export 
subsidy for agricultural promotions overseas (mainly composed of MAP and FMD 
programs), baseline assumptions requiring certain level of changes in government 
allocations on the export promotions for both consumer-oriented products (horticultural 
and non-horticultural commodities) and non-consumer-oriented products (bulk and 
intermediate goods) are applied.  
(18) 
(17) 
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Assuming a proportional change in government’s promotional expenditures for all 
agricultural exports at a 10% level (i.e. ) coupled with a smaller relative 
change in the expenditures for other agricultural exports at 1% level of , 
applying values of respective funding shares of horticultural , non-horticultural 
and other agricultural products  into equation (18) generates corresponding 
variations in the level of public allocation for horticultural and non-horticultural 
promotions in export markets.  The overall changes in the export subsidy for particular 
consumer-oriented products yields two extreme conditions. First as the total increase is 
spread over promotional expenditures for non horticultural exports only in the case of 
expanded government expenditures and second as the total decrease is spread over 
promotional expenditures for horticultural exports only in case of reduced government 
expenditures are examined in this study.  Holding the level of export subsidy on total 
agricultural products constant at . I make these assumptions on the likely 
decrease in government expenditures for export promotions of other agricultural 
products. This include a lower-bound , middle-bound  
and upper-bound  level, similarly, bring about corresponding changes in 
promotional allocation for horticultural and non-horticultural exports given the subsidy 
shares of different agricultural commodity groups. 
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Two tilted and three balanced conditions, called a “Seesaw Condition” as studied 
here, are thus introduced to characterize hypothetical scenarios from Table 5.2.1 to Table 
5.9.3.  
Toward Non-Horticultural – 
Huge Part of the Increase in Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural 
Exports Contributed by Increase in Non-Horticultural Subsidies: 
 
 Toward Horticultural – 
Huge Part of the Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural 
Exports Contributed by Decrease in Horticultural Subsidies: 
 
 
Balanced at Lower-Bound Level – 
Holding Constant the Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports, 
Applying a 1% Decrease in Subsidies for Non-Horticultural Products  
 
Balanced at Middle-Bound Level – 
Holding Constant the Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports, 
Applying a 5% Decrease in Subsidies for Non-Horticultural Products  
  
Balanced at Upper-Bound Level – 
Holding Constant the Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports, 
Allowing for a 10% Decrease in Subsidies for Non-Horticultural Products  
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Applying above baseline assumptions on selected elasticities and on changes in 
subsidy for different food groups further develops several scenarios to be considered in 
simulation analysis. Scenario I employs “Toward Non-Horticultural” condition with a 
10% increase in government expenditures for export promotions of U.S. farm products, 
for which the consequent market and nutritional outcomes are summarized in Table 5.2.1, 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3.  Scenario II, III, IV(a) and IV(b) employ “Toward Horticultural” 
condition emphasizing a 10% decrease in government expenditures for export promotions 
of U.S. farm products, for which the consequent market and nutritional impacts are 
presented in a similar set of tables, from Table 5.3.1 to 5.6.3.  The last three scenarios of 
V, VI and VII respectively employ “Balanced at Lower-Bound Level”, “Balanced at 
Middle-Bound Level” and “Balanced at Lower-Bound Level” condition, where a constant 
level of government expenditures for export promotions of U.S. agricultural products and 
consequent smaller, modest and larger changes in export subsidy on horticultural, non-
horticultural and other agricultural products are applied.  Information in Table 5.7, Table 
5.8 and Table 5.9 summarize the relevant economic and health implications. 
To characterize each scenario in a more specific way, the enlarged government 
budget induced by the decrease in export promotional expenditures are not redirected for 
domestic promotions in Scenario II and III. While the redirection of enlarged government 
budgets from export promotions to particular horticultural promotions in the domestic 
market is applied for Scenario IV(a) and IV(b).  From the industry perspective, since the 
decrease in government promotion allocation for agricultural exports has increased 
industry budgets for promotional efforts with less required matching to export subsidy, 
such expanded private investment is not diverted into domestic promotions by industries 
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in Scenario II. Scenario III and IV assumes that industries reallocate their budget from 
foreign to domestic promotions.  Facing the redirection of government expenditures for 
agricultural promotions from export market to domestic horticultural and non-
horticultural markets, the new domestic subsidy in Scenario IV(a) and IV(b) meets the 
same matching criteria as the one required in receiving government allocations for export 
promotional efforts. Here the generic promotion under the MAP program (for most 
horticultural products) requires a minimum 10% match. Brand promotion under the MAP 
program and promotional efforts in FMD programs (for most non-horticultural products) 
require a dollar-for-dollar match.   Two sub-scenarios are introduced as (a) and (b) under 
Scenario IV. For Scenario IV(a) I apply a 50% of the amount of redirected government 
expenditures targeting on domestic horticultural promotional activities and the other 50% 
targeting on domestic non-horticultural promotions. In Scenario IV(b), 90 % of the 
amount of redirected government subsidy is instead invested on domestic horticultural 
promotional activities while the remaining 10% is used for domestic non-horticultural 
promotions.  
I denote domestic promotional elasticity of horticultural and non-horticultural 
products in various tables to summarize the caloric and nutritional impacts of changes in 
government expenditures for export promotions of agricultural products. I use None to 
represents no reallocation or no cannibalization; Es represents equal domestic 
promotional elasticity for horticultural and non-horticultural products at lower level, 
; Nm represents the more elastic domestic promotions on 
non-horticultural products at medium level, ; Em 
represents equal domestic promotional elasticity for both products at medium level, 
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; Hm represents the more elastic domestic promotions on 
horticultural products at medium level, ; El represents 
equal domestic promotional elasticity for both products at higher level, 
; Nl represents the more elastic domestic promotions on non-
horticultural products at higher level, ; and Hl represents the 
more elastic domestic promotions on horticultural products at higher level, 
.  
5.2. Increase in Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions 
This section explores the economic and nutritional implication of a 10% increase in 
government expenditure for export promotions of all agricultural products, coupled with 
1% increase in promotional expenditures for exports of other agricultural products. To 
specifically examine one extreme case when government only increase the allocations for 
non-horticultural products out of the allocation for all the consumer-oriented food 
products, the “Leaning Toward Non-Horticultural” condition is applied in this section 
with the level of increase in promotional expenditures for non-horticultural exports set to 
35%.  This section examines various impacts induced by subsidy increment in Scenario I, 
for which the simulation results are summarized in Table 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
Table 5.2.1 shows that for non-horticultural products, in the absence of 
cannibalization effect, the demand price increases to the peak level while the domestic 
consumption decreases the least. When the cannibalization effect is taken into account, 
the level of price increase diminishes with higher consumers’ responsiveness to domestic 
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promotions for non-horticultural products while the level of corresponding decreased 
quantities consumed at home augments when consumers are more sensitive to such 
promotions. As to the horticultural market, there’s no change in the demand price of 
horticultural products since the external shock on its export market is suppressed by the 
assumption, . However, due to the product relationships between horticultural 
and non-horticultural products, domestic consumption of horticultural products increases 
when both products are substitutes for each other while it decreases when they are 
complements.  
Subsidy-induced welfare impacts implied by changes in price and domestic 
consumption are presented in Table 5.2.1 and Table 5.2.2. Lower-, middle- and upper-
bound levels that characterize vertical demand shifts in the domestic market are indicated 
when is set to 0, 0.5 and 1, respectively. Government’s expenditure increments are 
discussed in quantifying surplus changes imposed on domestic consumer by the increase 
in subsidy. In the non-horticultural market, regardless of various means the welfare 
effects on domestic consumers associated with subsidy increment are measured. 
Producers always gain while consumers always lose. Focusing on the positive cross-price 
elasticity at 0.2 where a substitution effect is assumed and when the cannibalization effect 
is turned off, a 10% increase in subsidy on all the agricultural products, coupled with a 
1% subsidy increase for other non-consumer-oriented products and a 35% subsidy 
increase for non-horticultural products, causes producer surplus to increase the most (up 
to $905 million) and consumer surplus to decrease the least ($687 million regardless of 
the impact level of domestic promotional efforts on consumers). Associated with a 
decrease in taxpayer surplus induced by such subsidy increment at $13 million, the social 
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welfare gain thus reaches $205 million as a whole. In a comparative framework when the 
cannibalization effect is recognized, the social welfare gain remains positive when 
domestic market promotions are assumed to have ignorable effects on consumers at 
 while such gains diminish with greater market response to domestic promotions 
for non-horticultural products. When domestic market promotions impose considerable 
effects on economic surplus received by consumers at the middle-bound level of  at 
0.5, the overall social welfare gain instead converts to a loss for the value of  greater 
than 0.045 coupled with  between 0.015 and 0.09, and such a loss amplifies with 
stronger responsiveness of domestic consumers to non-horticultural promotions. 
Increasing to 1.0, employed by Wohlgenant (1993) in measuring welfare change, 
intensifies both consumer and social welfare losses associated with given increases in 
subsidy, further underscoring the role of cannibalization effect. When the domestic 
promotional elasticity of both products are set to be equal at medium level, 
, the social welfare loss of $125 million dollars is incurred at 
 where producer gain of $826 million is swamped by consumer loss of $938 
million, compared to the social welfare gain of $31 million at . When consumers 
are assumed to be more responsive to domestic promotions for horticultural products than 
that for non-horticultural ones at medium level, , the 
social welfare loss incurred by imposing influential promotional impacts on consumers at 
 of $462 million more than doubled compared to its counterpart loss of $148 
million at . In the horticultural market, there is no change in producer surplus and 
the change in consumer surplus at  due to the constant market price level resulted 
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from no increase in government promotional expenditures for horticultural exports. When 
observable impacts of promotional efforts on domestic consumers are accounted at 
 or , the social welfare gain is less than $40 million when two products are 
complements while such gain converts to a loss of less than $50 million when the two 
products are substitutes.  
Table 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 presents the simulated quantified caloric and nutritional 
effects induced by such subsidy increment. The level of caloric-intake from the 
consumption of non-horticultural products decreases, associated with less than 200 
calories change from the consumption of horticultural products, bringing about a 
reduction at overall caloric consumption level, regardless of the different product 
relationships. Assuming some substitution effects taking place between two commodity 
groups, the caloric-intake level reduces the least in the absence of the cannibalization 
effect while a larger decrease in caloric consumption is observed in the presence of the 
cannibalization effect.  When the middle-bound level of domestic promotional elasticity 
is examined in the case of Nm, Em and Hm (where consumer responsiveness to domestic 
promotions for horticultural products is smaller, equal or greater than to domestic non-
horticultural promotions) The level of reduction in caloric consumption ranges between 
4000 to 5000 calories. This is accompanied by the decrease in the intake level of nutrients 
like fat (200 to 250 grams per capita per year) and sodium (800 to 1200 milligrams per 
capita per year). In spite of such encouraging caloric impacts and nutritional outcomes of 
certain nutrients, the reduction in yearly intake level of more health-sustaining nutrients 
as Fiber (10 to 15 grams per capita), Vitamin A (800 to 1100 micrograms per capita), 
Calcium (900 to 1220 milligrams per capita) and Iron (21 to 27 milligrams per capita) is 
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also observed. Corresponding relative changes in average daily intake level ranges 
between 0.12 to 0.16% for fiber, 0.23 to 0.30% for Vitamin A, 0.27 to 0.31% for 
Calcium, and 0.25 to 0.31% for Iron.  
5.3 Decrease in Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions— 
Subsequent Reservation of Enlarged Promotional Budgets  
This section examines the likely market, welfare and nutritional effects induced by 
a 10% decrease in government expenditures on export promotions for all agricultural 
products, coupled with 1% decrease in promotional allocations from government for the 
exports of other agricultural products. To specifically examine one extreme case when 
government only increase the allocations for horticultural products out of the allocation 
for all the consumer-oriented food products, the “Toward Horticultural” condition is 
applied in this section with the level of decrease in promotional expenditures for 
horticultural exports set at -47%.  Here the baseline assumption is that the overall 
increased allocations from government, implied by the budget enlargement resulted from 
dampened public support for agricultural export promotions, are not redirected for 
domestic promotions on both horticultural and non-horticultural products. As a result, 
two scenarios are further introduced. One explores economic and health impacts of 
decreases in subsidy levels, primarily for horticultural promotions, in foreign markets 
assuming that industries intend not to redirect, similarly, their promotional budget from 
foreign to domestic market on horticultural products, categorized in Scenario II.  The 
other considers the case when industries instead redirect their investment to boost the 
impacts of horticultural promotions in the home market, categorized in Scenario III.  
 Scenario II allows for a focus on positive cross-price elasticity of 0.2 that implies a 
substitution effect between horticultural and non-horticultural products. Table 5.3.1 
  55 
shows that ignoring the reallocation effect results in a significant decrease in price and 
increase in domestic consumption of horticultural products. When reallocation effect is 
recognized, larger domestic promotional elasticity of horticultural products (than that of 
non-horticultural products ), higher than 0.03, results in smaller decrease in price, smaller 
increase in consumption of horticultural products and smaller decrease in consumption of 
non-horticultural products. While smaller domestic promotional elasticity of horticultural 
products (less than 0.03) coupled with greater consumer responses to non-horticultural 
promotions in the home market instead results in a larger increase in consumption of 
horticultural products as well as a larger decrease in consumption of non-horticultural 
products, but by less than the market outcome observed in the absence of reallocation 
effect. 
In the welfare analysis summarized by Table 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, when two products 
are substitute, consumers always gain in terms of economic surplus at the expense of 
domestic producers in the horticultural market, regardless of the values set for  
and of the level of promotional effects on consumers at , resulting in an 
overall social welfare loss. Such surplus loss received by both producers and society as a 
whole dampens and such gain to consumer shrinks in the presence of a reallocation 
effect. When consumers are assumed to be equally responsive to domestic promotions for 
horticultural and non-horticultural products at the medium level, 
, consumer welfare gains diminish from $246 million to 
$232 million as higher level of is applied. This results in increasing losses to overall 
social surplus from $199 million to $213 million, given producer welfare loss of $457 
million and taxpayer welfare gain of $12 million. In another case when consumers are 
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assumed to be more responsive to domestic promotions for horticultural products than 
that for non-horticultural ones at medium level, , producer 
welfare lose $377 million while consumer gains $189 million when the middle-bound 
level of promotional impacts is assumed. This results in social welfare loss of $175 
million, and this is less than the societal economic loss in the case when consumers are 
equally less sensitive to domestic promotions for both horticultural and non-horticultural 
products.  When the value of  increases from 0 to 1, consumer gains associated with 
subsidy decrement is dampened and the social welfare loss is intensified, therefore further 
emphasizing the importance of considering the reallocation effect in measuring subsidy-
induced welfare impacts on domestic stakeholders.  As for the non-horticultural market, 
in face of constant price level due to the suppressed external shock on non-horticultural 
exports as , producer welfare level and the consumer welfare level at  
thus remain unchanged. While the consumer welfare gain converts to a loss when 
considerable impacts of domestic promotional efforts on consumers are assumed at the 
middle- and upper-bound level, resulting in an intensified social welfare loss ranging 
from $20 to $140 million when is set to 1.  
Table 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 summarize the simulated caloric and nutritional outcomes. 
Assuming a substitution effect between two commodity groups brings about the reduction 
in caloric intake from the consumption of non-horticultural products and an increase from 
the consumption of horticultural products, resulting in an overall reduction in the caloric 
consumption. When the reallocation effect is ignored, there is a larger decrease in overall 
caloric consumption, larger decrease in fat-intake, and larger increase in the intake level 
of health-sustaining nutrients, than the counterpart cases with a reallocation effect. When 
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it is characterized by different values set for , the results show the risk of 
overstating any encouraging caloric impacts that decrease in export subsidy for 
horticultural products would have contributed. With an emphasis on the middle-bound 
level of domestic promotional elasticity, indicated by Nm, Em, Hm, where consumers’ 
responsiveness to domestic promotions for horticultural products is assumed to be 
weaker, equal and stronger than that for non-horticultural ones, the decrease in total 
caloric consumption ranges between 2500 and 3000 calories. Further nutritional outcome 
shows a decrease in Fat-intake (relative change between -0.26 to 0.32% per capita per 
day) and increases in the intake of Fiber (daily change between 0.36 to 0.53%), Vitamin 
A (between 0.08 to 0.15%) and Vitamin C (between 0.94 to 1.33%). However, for other 
important micronutrients, the subsidy-induced nutritional impacts on domestic consumers 
instead implies increased intake for Sodium (from 428 to 756 milligrams per year) and 
decrease yearly intake of Calcium (from 480 to 580 milligrams) and Iron (from 3 to 5 
milligrams). This leads to somehow contradicting results against the successful reduction 
in overall domestic caloric consumption and the intake increment of certain health-
sustaining nutrients. 
When the diversion of the industry investment from foreign to domestic 
horticultural promotion is considered in Scenario III, Table 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show that 
ignoring the reallocation effect results in the largest decrease in producer surplus of $529 
million and smallest increase in consumer welfare level at $273 million. These effects are 
accompanied by a taxpayer welfare gain of $12 million, and an overall reduction in 
societal economic surplus of $243 million. When the reallocation effect is recognized in 
the presence of a substitution effect and the middle-bound level of consumers’ 
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responsiveness to domestic promotions for both horticultural and non-horticultural 
products, consumer welfare gain (between $207 and $260 million) remains at the expense 
of producers (between $390 to $510 million), resulting in social welfare loss (between -
$177 and -$230 million) when . As considerable impacts of domestic promotional 
efforts on consumer welfare are observed at , social welfare loss converts to a 
gain of $111 million when domestic consumers are more responsive to horticultural 
promotions than to non-horticultural promotions in the home market at medium level, 
. With upper-bound level of set at 1, the overall societal loss 
converts to a gain when domestic consumers respond both equivalently, 
, (societal gain of $10 million) and stronger, 
, (societal gain of $400 million) to promotions for horticultural 
than to non-horticultural products. In comparison, reallocations of industry promotional 
funds from foreign to domestic markets, in response to the reduced export subsidy 
primarily on horticultural products, bring about larger increase in consumer welfare gain 
and smaller decrease in social welfare loss (even incurring a gain in certain value range of 
domestic promotional elasticity). 
Table 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 summarize the simulated caloric and nutritional outcomes in 
Scenario III. Assuming a substitution effect between the two commodity groups, the 
overall caloric consumption and fat-intake reduces the most when the reallocation effect 
is ignored, thus bearing the risk of overstating the health benefit that a considerable 
decrease in export subsidy on horticultural products would have implied. Recognizing the 
reallocation effect brings about a decrease in total caloric-intake level ranging between 
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1000 to 2400 calories when consumers are both more responsive to domestic non-
horticultural promotions than to promotions for horticultural products at medium, 
, and higher level, , and 
equally responsive to promotions on two commodity groups at lower, 
, and medium level, . Increases 
in caloric consumption by less than 3500 calories (converted into weight change in 1 
pound) are also observed for 2121 calories when consumers are more responsive to 
domestic non-horticultural promotions at medium level of 
, and 3180 calories when consumers are equally 
responsive to promotions on two commodity groups at higher level of 
. To further examine the nutritional implications from the 
above cases that could be considered generating desirable subsidy-induced caloric 
outcomes in domestic market. In these cases, the reduced caloric consumption or the 
slight increase in caloric-intake level per capita per year is observed, intake level of Fat 
reduces, along with increased intake of Fiber, Vitamins and Iron.  These results are 
consistent with the health implication from above caloric outcome; however, the 
increased intake level of Sodium contradicts previous encouraging caloric and nutritional 
results.   
In comparison to the scenario where no reallocation of industry monies from export 
to domestic promotions is assumed, with similar focus on the middle-bound level of 
consumers’ responsiveness to domestic promotions for both products at Nm, Em and Hm, 
in spite of smaller decreases (even an increase for Hm) in total caloric consumption, 
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larger increase in nutrient-intake level of Fiber, Vitamins, Calcium and Iron is observed.  
Specifically, when domestic consumers are more responsive to promotions for 
horticultural products at , caloric-intake level increases 
with 2121 calories when promotion-reallocation by industry takes place compared to a 
decrease of 2521 calories in the case of no reallocation effort is adopted by industry. 
From more of a nutritional perspective, the presence of industry promotion-reallocation 
results in larger increase in the yearly intake of Fiber (converted daily change of 1.89% 
per capita), Vitamin A (1.07%), Vitamin C (3.8%), Calcium (0.28%) and Iron (0.54%) 
than the relative change in the daily intake level per capita of Fiber (0.36%), Vitamin A 
(0.08%), Vitamin C (0.94%), Calcium (-0.14%) and Iron (-0.05%) in the absence of 
industry promotion-reallocation.  
5.4 Decrease in Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions— 
      Subsequent Redirection of Enlarged Promotional Budgets   
This section examines the welfare and nutritional implications by applying the 
“Leaning Toward Horticultural” condition for a 47% decrease in government 
promotional expenditures on horticultural exports, accompanied by the redirection of 
subsidies from export promotions to domestic promotions for horticultural and non-
horticultural products.  Simulated results of a 50% redirection to domestic horticultural 
promotion denoted as Scenario IV(a), are summarized in Tables 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and 5.5.3; 
results from a 90% redirection, detailed in Scenario IV(b) are shown in Tables 5.6.1, 
5.6.2, and 5.6.3. 
Table 5.5.1, 5.6.1, 5.5.2 and 5.6.2, for both cases where different proportions of 
new domestic subsidy allocated on horticultural and non-horticultural products are 
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applied, the absence of reallocation effect brings about larger decrease in producer 
welfare loss, smaller increase in consumer welfare gain and consequent larger decrease in 
social surplus loss in the domestic horticultural market. These changes in economic 
surplus hold across domestic promotional elasticities of horticultural and non-
horticultural products, regardless of different product relationships assumed. Therefore, 
ignoring the reallocation effect would understate the welfare impact on producers, 
consumers and the society as a whole. 
Focusing the analysis on the substitution effect in the domestic horticultural market, 
when the reallocation effect is recognized, for both Scenario IV(a) and IV(b), stronger 
consumer responsiveness to domestic promotions for horticultural products results in 
greater consumer welfare gain and smaller social welfare loss (or even a welfare gain in 
certain circumstances) as  equal to 0.5 or 1. When the promotional influence on 
domestic purchasing behavior is ignorable, a diminishing trend in consumer welfare gain 
is observed, thus resulting in larger social welfare loss than when  is set equal to 0.5 or 
1. The impact of promotional activities on economic surplus received by domestic 
consumers further underscores the important role that the reallocation effect has on the 
welfare results. 
 To be more specific, I also consider a ranges of promotional elasticities in the 
analysis. First consider one pair of elasticity values when consumers are equally 
responsive to domestic promotion for horticultural and non-horticultural products when 
. In Scenario IV(a) with the same focus on substitution effect 
and on domestic horticultural markets, compared to the social welfare loss of $67 million 
at , overall social welfare gain converts to a gain of $88.59 million when  
  62 
increases to 1. This leads to a producer welfare loss of $476.52 million, the consumer 
welfare gain of $559.44 million and the taxpayer welfare gain of $5.67 million. When a 
higher proportion of redirected subsidy on domestic horticultural promotions is assumed 
in Scenario IV(b), the overall social welfare gain converts to a gain of $146.61 million at 
. This is a result of producer welfare loss of $476.52 million, a consumer welfare 
gain of $622.7 million and the taxpayer welfare gain of $0.43 million. In short summary, 
for the comparison between scenarios, the redirection of government allocations to 
domestic promotional efforts results in higher social welfare gain than what would be 
otherwise observed in Scenario II and III. In addition, the more government dollars spent 
on domestic horticultural promotion, the higher overall economic surplus gain received 
by domestic horticultural market. The impact of promotion on consumer welfare also 
influences the consequent economic surplus received by consumers and the society as a 
whole. Similar welfare outcomes could be observed in Table 5.5.2 and 5.6.2 when 
consumers are more responsive to domestic promotions for horticultural products than for 
non-horticultural products when . At , the social 
welfare gain is $766.76 million, which is more than twice the gain when  is set equal to 
0.5. When 50% of government dollars are redirected for domestic horticultural 
promotion, the social welfare gain is $608.91 million, which is nearly three times the gain 
at  when another assumption of 90% redirection is applied. 
In Scenarios IV(a) and IV(b), when horticultural and non-horticultural products are 
substitutes and reallocation effect is recognized, the consumer welfare gain and social 
welfare gain are both greater than the counterparts in horticultural market. This result 
hinges on domestic promotion elasticities of horticultural and non-horticultural products 
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higher than 0.01. However, if the two products are complements, the consumer welfare 
gain converts to a loss, and there is a greater social welfare loss. 
Extending the analysis from economic impacts to dietary impacts, Table 5.5.2 and 
5.5.3 summarize the simulated nutritional outcomes for Scenario IV(a). Table 5.6.2 and 
5.6.3 shows the results for Scenario IV(b). 
Here we see an increase in domestic consumption of horticultural products and a 
decrease in consumption of non-horticultural products. This results in the increase in 
caloric consumption from horticultural products and a decrease from non-horticultural 
products. In the absence of any reallocation effect, total caloric-intake level reduces the 
most (a reduction of 3062 calories per capita per year) compared to the changes in caloric 
consumption when reallocation effect is recognized. In the presence of a reallocation 
effect, different levels of change in caloric-intake from two major food groups further 
contribute to the decrease in the yearly total caloric consumption per capita when 
 and  at lower level. We see the increase in the yearly intake-level when 
 and  at medium and higher level. In this regard, ignoring reallocation 
effect would have overstated the health benefits. 
Next I further focus on the nutritional impact analysis on substitution effect implied 
by positive cross-price elasticity and the medium level of consumer responsiveness to 
domestic promotions for both products at Nm, Em and Hm. The reduction in caloric 
consumption level converts to an increase when consumers are equally responsive to both 
promotional efforts at  and more responsive to domestic 
promotions for horticultural products when . In addition, 
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we see a larger increase in the intake level of Fiber, Vitamins, Calcium and Iron but 
smaller decrease in fat-intake and larger increase in sodium-intake level.  In the 
comparison between scenarios, higher proportion of government dollars redirected 
towards the domestic promotions for horticultural products results in larger increase in 
the overall caloric consumption level at Em and Hm. It also brings about a greater 
decrease in caloric-intake level at Nm when a more elastic domestic promotions for non-
horticultural products in assumed. These results also show a greater increase in the intake 
for Fiber, Vitamins, Calcium, Iron and Sodium and larger decrease in Fat-intake. 
Specifically, when consumers are equally responsive to domestic promotions for both 
commodity groups, when , greater caloric consumption level 
is observed in Scenario IV(b) than in Scenario IV(a). However, from a nutritional 
perspective, the caloric impacts are also accompanied by a larger increase in intake level 
of selected health-sustaining nutrients like Fiber (relative change of 1.47% per day per 
capita), Vitamin A (0.77%), Vitamin C  (3.07%), Calcium (0.12%) and Iron (0.35%) 
given an assumed 90% redirection of government dollars on domestic horticultural 
promotions. This compares to the change in Fiber (1.32%), Vitamin A (0.69%), Vitamin 
C (2.76%), Calcium (0.10%) and Iron (0.30%) from a 50% redirection. Similar caloric 
and nutritional outcomes could also be observed in either the case when consumers are 
more responsive to domestic promotions for non-horticultural products when 
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5.5 Constant Government Expenditures for Agricultural Export Promotions— 
      Impacts on Allocations for Food and Non-Food Exports 
Holding constant the level of government expenditures for export promotions of all 
agricultural products, this section examines the welfare and nutritional implications from 
the change in export subsidy for horticultural, non-horticultural and other agricultural 
products at three levels. At the lower level, a 1% decrease in government expenditures for 
export promotions of other agricultural products is assumed, and the results from 
equivalent proportional changes of 8% in opposite directions, for horticultural (decrease) 
and non-horticultural (increase) products of 8% (see Scenario V). Similarly, at the 
medium level, a 5% decrease in government expenditures for export promotions of other 
agricultural products is assumed, and results show equivalent proportional changes of 
38% in Scenario VI. When a 10% decrease in government expenditures for export 
promotions of other agricultural products is assumed for the higher impact level, we see a 
76% decrease in government dollars on horticultural export promotions while a 76% 
increase on non-horticultural export promotions (see Scenario VII). 
As shown in Table 5.7.1, 5.7.2, 5.8.1, 5.8.2, 5.9.1 and 5.9.2, in the comparison 
within each scenario with a focus of analysis on the substitution effect, for the 
horticultural market, the absence of the reallocation effect on domestic market results in 
the greatest producer welfare loss and the least consumer welfare gain, and generate the 
greatest social welfare loss of $42 million at lower impact level, of $197 million at 
medium impact level, and of $387 million at higher impact level. In the non-horticultural 
market, ignoring the cannibalization effect instead brings about the greatest producer 
welfare gain and smaller consumer welfare loss (larger consumer welfare loss when 
promotional impacts on domestic consumer welfare are ignored. When the domestic 
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promotional elasticity changes to  and 
 social welfare surplus is $46 million at lower impact level, is 
$224 million at medium impact level, and is $457 million at higher impacts level.  In the 
presence of the reallocation and cannibalization effect, and when there is a decrease in 
export subsidy (for horticultural products), consumer gains at the expense of producers in 
the domestic horticultural market. When there is an increase in export subsidy (for non-
horticultural products), producer instead gains at the expense of the consumer in the 
domestic non-horticultural market. Only when consumers are more responsive to 
domestic promotions for horticultural products than for non-horticultural ones and with 
considerable impacts of domestic promotional efforts on consumer welfare level, both 
producer and consumer gain at the same time. This case generates greatest social welfare 
gain in the non-horticultural market, characterized in Scenario V, VI and VII, 
respectively. Again, ignoring the reallocation effect in domestic horticultural market 
would have overstated the overall social welfare loss. Ignoring the cannibalization effect 
in the domestic non-horticultural market would overstate the social welfare gain. 
Furthermore, increasing from 0 to 1 results in a smaller decrease in social surplus for 
the horticultural market while a smaller increase for the non-horticultural market. This 
implies that a higher level of promotional impacts on domestic consumers benefits the 
horticultural market while it reduces the economic gain (even converts to a loss) enjoyed 
by the society in non-horticultural market. 
When allowing for the substitute assumption, when !  is set equal to 1, and when 
consumer responsiveness to domestic promotions for both horticultural and non-
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horticultural products are set at medium level of , we see a 
greater social welfare loss for large decreases in export subsidies for horticultural 
products and large increases in export subsidy for non-horticultural products. The 
decrease in economic surplus ranges between $6 million in the horticultural market and 
$13 million in the non-horticultural market at the lower impact level. They further range 
between $24 and $59 million at medium impact level, and between $36 and $105 million 
at higher impacts level. When we assume stronger consumer responsiveness to domestic 
promotions for horticultural products than for non-horticultural ones, we see greater 
social welfare gain. Here, the increase in economic surplus is $53 million in horticultural 
market and $11 million in non-horticultural market at lower impact level; it is $260 and 
$57 million at the medium impact level, and $541 and $126 million at the higher impact 
level. Larger changes in government expenditures for agricultural export promotions 
contribute to greater social welfare gain in horticultural market when consumers are more 
responsive to domestic horticultural promotions. There is greater social welfare loss in 
non-horticultural market when the domestic promotional elasticity of non-horticultural 
products is more elastic than that of the horticultural products. 
The nutritional implications are respectively summarized in Tables 5.7.3, 5.8.3, and 
5.9.3 for the Scenarios V, VI and VII. The absence of the reallocation effect in the 
horticultural market and the absence of the cannibalization effect in the non-horticultural 
market understate the health benefits of reduced caloric consumption per capita. When  
, the larger level of change in government expenditures for 
export promotions of horticultural, non-horticultural and other agricultural products 
results in greater reduction in overall caloric-intake level. It also leads to a greater 
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decrease in Fat intake, and a greater increase in the intake level of Fiber and Vitamin C. 
However, it also lead to a greater increase in Sodium intake and a greater decrease in the 
intake of healthy nutrients like Vitamin A, Calcium and Iron. Furthermore, greater 
consumer responsiveness to domestic promotions for horticultural products leads to an 
increase in the intake of Vitamin A. The simulation results show that there is a trade-off 
observed between the reduction in caloric-intake per capita per year and changes in the 
intake of Calcium (decrease), Iron (decrease) and Sodium (increase). This outcome holds 
given that total government promotional expenditures for all agricultural exports are held 
constant coupled with lower, medium and higher levels of change in export subsidies for 
horticultural, non-horticultural, and other agricultural products. 
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VI.  Conclusion and Discussion 
6.1 Summary 
This study employs an equilibrium displacement model (following Alston et al., 
2009), developed in a two-market two-commodity framework, to explore the welfare and 
nutritional impacts of changes in government expenditures on export promotions for U.S. 
horticultural and non-horticultural products. Subsidy-induced effects on domestic markets 
are considered using a similar approach as Kinnucan and Cai (2010) to capture 
comprehensive implications from likely policy changes in agricultural trade promotions.  
When government increases the promotional expenditures for non-horticultural 
exports, producers gain at the expense of consumers in the presence of a cannibalization 
effect in the domestic market. My results show that this would lead to a reduction in the 
overall caloric-intake level, accompanied by a reduction in the intake of selected health-
sustaining nutrients.  When cannibalization effect is ignored, there is the risk of 
overstating the social economic benefit and of understating the health benefits. 
If the government decreases the promotional expenditures for horticultural exports, 
consumers gain at the expense of producers in the domestic market. Nutritional 
implications from such a change in export subsidy expenditure show mixed caloric 
outcomes for domestic consumers. These results depend upon whether the government 
decides to redirect funds on domestic promotional efforts, and on the proportions of 
redirected government expenditures spent on horticultural promotions in the domestic 
market.  Reduced caloric consumption, a decrease in Fat-intake and an increase in 
Vitamin-intake are observed, regardless of various levels of consumer responsiveness to 
domestic promotions for horticultural and non-horticultural products, in the absence of 
subsidy redirection. Given that subsidy redirection takes place with a larger portion of 
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government dollars subsidizing domestic horticultural promotions, as domestic 
consumers become more sensitive to horticultural promotions we see an increase in 
overall caloric-intake level. We also see a smaller decrease in fat-intake and larger 
increases in the intake of selected minerals and vitamins with weaker consumer 
responsiveness to domestic promotional efforts. If the reallocation effect is ignored, 
economic surplus received by society as a whole would be understated and the health 
benefits would have been overstated. This also implies an understatement of nutritional 
benefits from the intake of selected healthy nutrients as well as an overstatement of the 
intake of less healthy nutrients. 
When government expenditures for export promotions of all the agricultural exports 
are held constant, I also consider different changes in export subsidies applied to 
horticultural, non-horticultural and other agricultural products. For a decrease in 
promotional expenditures for other agricultural exports and additional promotion for the 
two primary agricultural commodity groups, consumers gain at the expense of producers 
in the domestic horticultural market. At the same time, producers gain at the expense of 
consumers in the non-horticultural market. Reduced caloric consumption is observed 
regardless of the level of consumer responsiveness to domestic promotional efforts. A 
larger decrease in total caloric-intake is induced by greater proportional changes in 
government promotion expenditures for horticultural and non-horticultural exports. 
Results show that there are mixed changes in the intake of selected healthy nutrients: We 
see an increased intake of Fiber and Vitamin C and decreased intake of Vitamin A, 
Calcium and Iron. Once again, ignoring the reallocation effect would understate the 
social economic benefits in the domestic horticultural market. Together, the health 
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benefits, in terms of the decrease in overall caloric-intake level, are understated in the 
absence of subsidy-induced effects on domestic demand. 
Overall, this study attempts to broaden the economic perspective on the impacts of 
non-price export promotion programs. I carefully examine the caloric and nutritional 
implications for changes in government allocations on agricultural exports. Using a 
detailed simulation model, I found that raising export subsidies on non-horticultural 
products benefits domestic producers at the expense of consumers; cutting subsidies on 
horticultural products benefits domestic consumers at the expense of producers.  
When facing export subsidy increases, domestic consumers are harmed, both for 
the rising price in the domestic market (induced by the outward-shift export demand) and 
for the diversion of industry dollars from domestic market promotions (induced by 
government expenditures for export promotions.) Overall, an increase in export subsidies 
reduces caloric consumption level in the domestic market. However, decreases in the 
intake of selected healthy nutrients are also observed. Given a decrease in export subsidy, 
domestic producers are harmed, both because that domestic price is lowered by the 
inward-shift in export demand and that industry dollars are reallocated for promotional 
efforts in the domestic market. The decrease in total caloric-intake is observed for 
domestic consumers, and it is accompanied by increases in the intake of selected healthy 
nutrients. 
6.2 Policy Implication 
Government allocations for Market Development Programs operated by USDA, 
like Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development Programs (FMD), 
are designed to help maintain and develop foreign markets for U.S. farm products. They 
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have been subject to much controversy since 1996, with the claim that the public support 
of export promotions are actually promoting “corporate welfare”. Critics argued that 
export assistance from the government should have been targeted at smaller and less 
export-experienced firms (U.S. GAO 1995, 1997). Another criticism maintains that there 
is no need for government assistance if private promotional investment is economically 
viable. For a public role in export promotion to be justifiable, there needs to be existence 
of market failures such as the positive externality resulted from foreign market 
promotions. In this case, competitor countries could free-ride on U.S. government 
programs, and the significantly lower economic returns to promotions in the absence of 
support are required. Some studies have suggested such market failures exist in the export 
promotion efforts for major horticultural products (Richards, Ispelen and Kagan, 1997; 
Richards and Patterson, 1998), yet questions remain on the appropriate level of 
government support in U.S agricultural trade promotions.  
Government allocations to MAP and FMD programs in The Agriculture Reform, 
Food and Jobs Act of 2012 are $200 (Table 1.1.2) and $34.5 (Table 1.2) million, 
respectively. We also see a significant amount of public spending on export promotions 
allocated in 2004 and 2008 Farm Bill. However, policymakers and critics of Farm Bill 
spending have raised their worrying voices about promoting the corporate welfare and 
about replacing industry private investment with taxpayer dollars. In a benefit-cost 
analysis of such government support on agricultural trade promotions, Kinnucan and Cai 
(2010) concluded that USDA expenditures on non-price export promotion of farm 
products maybe too high, an opposite result to previous studies justifying the role of 
public supports in export promotions. 
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Here I Extend the research that focuses on economic impact of export promotions 
to consider the health implications for export promotion programs in domestic market 
This study attempts to provide a more comprehensive policy analysis to better understand 
two questions. First, whether the level of change in government support for export 
promotions is correcting market failures characterized by the under-promotion of 
domestic producers for their own products compared to the industry optimal level 
(Dwyer, 1994) Second, to evaluate domestic consumer welfare changes that might result 
from a subsidy-induced change in price and quantities of horticultural and non-
horticultural products. Once the caloric and nutritional linkage is made to the likely 
changes in public allocations on agricultural export promotions, I expect that any 
decrease in export subsidies for horticultural products and the increase in export subsidy 
for non-horticultural products would together have considerable impacts on quantities 
consumed for both commodity groups. This further contributes to the reduced caloric 
consumption and increased intake of healthy nutrients. Dietary quality in domestic 
markets could also be expected to improve with rising consumption of fruits and 
vegetables (defined as horticultural crops in this study) and lowering consumption of 
more energy-dense food (broadly defined as non-horticultural crops in this analysis).  
Instead of increasing or decreasing the total amount of export subsidy, a more 
complicated policy design could be developed to apply different subsidies to different 
food groups in order to encourage healthier consumption patterns at home. Additionally, 
the matching requirement for export subsidies serves as an economic incentive that could 
be employed to encourage producers to promote more efficiently. Currently, an export 
subsidy match varies by product and the type of advertising (e.g., generic or branded 
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promotion). Here I propose that the redirection of original match priorities to the 
requirement based on the type of agricultural products (under horticultural, non-
horticultural or other agricultural product groups) promoted in foreign markets could 
bring about changes in industry promotions for specific products. Therefore, as domestic 
or export demand for horticultural and non-horticultural products are shifted, we better 
understand the quantities consumed and dietary patterns. 
6.3 Ongoing Work 
A two-market, two-commodity model is presented in this stud. However, a full 
consideration of nutritional impacts for changes in government expenditures for 
agricultural export promotions should consider the links between food products at the 
retail level and the raw agricultural materials in a multi-market setting. Wohlegnant 
(1989) provides a framework that could be extended here to account for the indirect 
impacts of export subsidies for bulk products on further process products sold in the retail 
stores.  
Also, an aggregate measure of either horticultural or non-horticultural products 
composed of various agricultural commodities fails to precisely capture the exact changes 
in any one product. This may be balanced out with opposite changes for substitute goods 
under same categories (e.g., sweeteners and dairy products in the non-horticultural 
group). In this way, the product relationship between commodities under the same food 
groups should be considered as there are many substitutes or complements between 
horticultural and non-horticultural product groups. 
One way to address such concerns is to use a two-market, multi-product model to 
more fully explore economic and health impacts.  This could include separate equations 
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of different food products at the retail level as well as farm commodities used as raw 
materials for retail foods.  For this larger set of products, it would require relevant 
information on the demand responses as well as supply elasticities, promotional 
elasticities, export subsidy level, advertising shares, and competitors’ expenditures 
(Alston, Freebairn, and James, 2001). It would lead to a more accurate measure of 
changes in price, domestic consumption and surplus levels from change in export 
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Figure 3.1 Economy-wide effects of nonprice export promotions—Increased-Subsidy Scenario 
Panel A.   
Without Cannibalization Effect 
Panel B.   
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FIGURE 
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Panel B.   
With Reallocation Effect 
Figure 3.2 Economy-wide effects of nonprice export promotions—Decreased-Subsidy Scenario 
Panel A.   
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Table 1.1.1 FY 2011 Funding for Horticultural, Non-Horticultural and Other Agricultural Products under MAP 
Market Access Program 
Horticultural Products Non-Horticultural Products 
Other Agricultural and  
Forestry Products 
Organizations Allocations Organization Allocation Organization Allocation 
Washington Apple 
Commission $5,199,788 U.S. Meat Export Federation $16,261,732 
Cotton Council 
International $20,234,954 
Florida Department of 
Citrus $4,937,966 
Food Export Association of 
the Midwest USA $10,919,428 
National Potato 
Promotion Board $4,870,824 




Commission $4,614,261 U.S. Grains Council $8,621,582 
Pear Bureau Northwest $3,632,830 Food Export USA Northeast $8,152,605 
American Hardwood 





Products Association $8,569,725 
California Table Grape 
Commission $3,494,622 U.S. Wheat Associates $6,798,051 Pet Food Institute $1,601,375 
California Prune Board $3,339,658 
Southern United States Trade 
Association $5,831,384 
U.S. Livestock 
Genetics Export, Inc. $1,097,601 
Sunkist Growers, Inc. $3,107,359 Wine Institute $5,585,230 




of California $3,079,916 
USA Poultry and Egg Export 
Council $5,461,208 
American Biomass 
Trade Cooperative $145,000 
Raisin Administrative 
Committee $2,677,594 U.S. Dairy Export Council $4,529,746 
U.S. Hide, Skin & 
Leather Association $140,228 












Washington State Fruit 
Commission $1,192,087 
USA Rice Federation/U.S. 
Rice Producers Association $3,758,042 
Total Funding for 
Other non-food 
products under MAP $32,089,048 
Source: USDA, FAS: http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/webstories/map_042911.asp
TABLE 
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       Table 1.1.2 FY 2011 Funding for Horticultural and Non-Horticultural Products under MAP (cont’d) 
Market Access Programs 
Horticultural Products Non-Horticultural Products 
Organizations Allocations Organization Allocation 
California Agricultural 
Export Council $993,079 
National Association of State 
Departments of Agriculture $2,750,562 
California Strawberry 
Commission $789,070 American Peanut Council $2,414,321 
Western Pistachio 
Association/Cal-Pure 




Advisory Board $743,127 
National Sunflower 
Association $1,218,250 
U.S. Apple Export 
Council $685,480 U.S. Dry Bean Council $1,150,793 
California Fresh Tomato 
Growers/Florida Tomato 
Committee $505,603 
USA Dry Pea and Lentil 
Council $1,122,955 
Organic Trade 
Association $435,293 Welch Foods, Inc. $907,824 




California Cling Peach 
Board $353,475 
Northwest Wine Promotion 
Coalition $805,130 
Cherry Marketing 
Institute $259,988 Intertribal Agriculture Council $741,009 
National Watermelon 
Promotion Board $254,406 Brewers Association Inc. $385,015 
Ginseng Board of 
Wisconsin $209,597 
American Sheep Industry 
Association $381,466 
Georgia Pecan Growers $200,000 
New York Wine and Grape 
Foundation $376,215 
California Kiwifruit 
Commission $184,268 The Catfish Institute $335,605 
Hawaii Papaya Industry 
Association $173,027 The Popcorn Board $319,607 
California Asparagus 
Commission $114,709 Distilled Spirits Council $211,127 
Texas Produce Export 
Association $95,654   
Total Fundings for 
Horticultural Products 
under MAP $51,114,051 
Total Fundings for Non-
Horticultural Products under 
MAP $111,208,133 
MAP reserve $5,589,768 
Total Available FY 2011 Fundings for Market Access Program $200,000,000 
     Source: USDA, FAS: http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/webstories/map_042911.asp 
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                 Table 1.2 FY 2011 Funding for Non-Horticultural and  
                                 Other Agricultural and Forestry Products under FMD 
Foreign Market Development Programs 
Non-Horticultural products 
Other Agricultural and  
Forestry Products 





U.S. Wheat Associates $5,033,535 
U.S. Grains Council $4,386,866 
U.S. Meat Export 
Federation $1,612,357 
USA Rice Federation $1,457,865 
American Hardwood 





Products Association $2,796,545 
USA Poultry and Egg 
Export Council $1,262,021 
U.S. Livestock Genetics 
Export, Inc.                           $607,213 
National Renderers 
Association $837,791 
American Seed Trade 
Association $219,486 
American Peanut Council $628,631 
Leather Industries of 
America $135,224 
U.S. Dairy Export Council $595,464 
U.S. Hide, Skin and 





American Sheep Industry 
Association $161,354 
Mohair Council of 
America $8,808 
USA Dry Pea and Lentil 
Council $157,319   
U.S. Dry Bean Council $103,611   
North American Millers 
Association $23,833   
Total Funding for Non-
Horticultural Products 
under FMD $23,160,893 
Total Funding for Other 
non-food products under 
MAP $8,477,834 
FMD Reserve $2,798,273 
Total Available Funding for Foreign Market Development Program $34,500,000 
       Source: USDA, FAS: http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/webstories/fmd_042911.asp 
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Table 4.1 Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Market-Share Equation for U.S. Horticultural and Non-Horticultural Exports 
Variable/Statistic Parameter in 
Horticultural 
Export Demand 
Model A Model B Parameter in 
Horticultural 
Export Demand 
Model A Model B 







Own Price  -0.0054 (-0.23) --  
-0.168 
(-1.84)* -- 

































SE of Regression  0.0552 0.0540  0.0535 0.0559 
Computed F-test 
for Model A vs. B 
  0.55   1.91 
Significance level   0.5836   0.1735 
Note: Model A refers to equation (10a) for horticultural products and equation (10b) for non-horticultural products.  
          Model B refers to alternative model as  for horticultural products and as  for non-horticultural products. 
          * indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5 % significance level; *** indicates a 1% significance level.
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Table 4.2 Adjusted Ordinary Least Squares estimates of Market-Share Equation for U.S. Horticultural and Non-Horticultural Exports 





















Own Price  -0.005 (-0.18) --  
-0.146 
(-1.63) -- 

































SE of Regression  0.06423 0.0612  0.04946 0.0508 
Computed F-test for 
Model A vs. B 
  0.02   1.46 
Significance level   0.9829   0.2578 
Note: Model A refers to equation (10a) for horticultural products and equation (10b) for non-horticultural products.  
          Model B refers to alternative model as  for horticultural products and as  for non-horticultural products. 
          * indicates a 10% significance level; ** indicates a 5 % significance level; *** indicates a 1% significance level. 
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Table 4.3 Baseline Values for Model Calibration 
Item Definition Value Source 
 Government expenditure in export promotion for horticultural products (mil. dol.) 26 Kinnucan, 2010 & FAS, USDA 
 Total expenditure in export promotion for horticultural products (mil. dol.) 76 Kinnucan, 2010 
 Total expenditures in domestic market promotion for horticultural products (mil. dol.)          49 Kinnucan, 2010 
 
Industry monies on promotion for horticultural products 99 Calculated 
  125 Calculated 
  0.21 Calculated 
  0.79 Calculated 
  0.39 Calculated 
  0.61 Calculated 
 Government expenditure in export promotion for non-horticultural products (mil. dol.) 36 Kinnucan, 2010 & FAS, USDA 
 Total expenditure in export promotion for non-horticultural products (mil. dol.) 108 Kinnucan, 2010 
 Total expenditures in domestic market promotion for non- horticultural products (mil. dol.) 560 Kinnucan, 2010 
 
Industry monies on promotion for non-horticultural products 632 Calculated 
         668 Calculated 
  0.05 Calculated 
  0.95 Calculated 
  0.84 Calculated 
  0.16 Calculated 
 
Gross farm value of U.S. production for horticultural products (mil. dol.) 24,636 ERS, USDA 
 
 24,537 Calculated 
 
Value of U.S. farm exports for horticultural products (mil. dol.) 12,082 FAS, USDA 
 
 12,554 Calculated 
  0.004 Calculated 
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  0.51 Calculated 
  0.49 Calculated 
 
Gross farm value of U.S. production for non-horticultural products (million $) 155,887 ERS, USDA 
 
 157,255 Calculated 
 
Value of U.S. farm exports for non-horticultural products (million $) 37,603 FAS, USDA 
 
 120,284 Calculated 
  0.004 Calculated 
  0.76 Calculated 
  0.24 Calculated 
 Domestic supply elasticity of horticultural products 0.6 Assumed for Parameterization 
 Domestic supply elasticity of non-horticultural products 0.6 Assumed for Parameterization 
 Domestic own-price elasticity of horticultural products -0.72 Huang and Lin, 2000 
 Export demand elasticity of horticultural products -3.46* Estimated 
 Domestic own-price elasticity of non-horticultural products -0.447 Richards et al., 2005 
 Export demand elasticity of non-horticultural products -2.48* Estimated 
 
Domestic cross-price elasticity for both horticultural products & non-horticultural products 0.2 -0.16 
Huang, 1986 
Richards et al., 2005 
 Export promotion elasticity of horticultural products 0.282*  Estimated 
 Export promotion elasticity of non-horticultural products 0.12* Estimated 
 Domestic promotion elasticity of horticultural products [0, 0.2] Assumed for Parameterization 
 Domestic promotion elasticity of non-horticultural products [0, 0.1]  Assumed for Parameterization 
 Budget diversion elasticity for horticultural products 0.887 Estimated 
 Budget diversion elasticity for non-horticultural products 0.873 Estimated 
*Re-estimated export demand and promotional elasticity, allowing for adjustment of influential data points. 
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   Table 4.4 Literatures on Own-Price & Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand for Horticultural Products 
Fruits  Vegetables 






et al., 2005 
You et al., 
1996 
Andreyeva 
et al, 2008 
Huang and 
Lin, 2000 
Richards et al., 
2005 
You et al., 
1996 Andreyeva et al, 2008 
Grain 
(cereal)  
-0.042 -0.1   
(cereal)  
-0.043    
Meat: beef -0.17  -0.095 -0.13 (flour) -0.0007  
Meat: pork -0.02 -0.16 -0.083  -0.046  
Poultry -0.023  (flour) -0.1  -0.049 -0.14 -0.17  
Egg -0.022  -0.055  -0.012  0.035  
Dairy -0.078 -0.25 -0.13  -0.035 -0.24 -0.05  
Fruits -0.72 -0.385 -0.4 -0.7 -0.029 -0.1 0.14  
Veg. -0.087 -0.18 0.17  -0.72 -0.21 -0.034 -0.58 
Fish         
Sweets   0.082    0.11  
Fat -0.024 -0.012 -0.007    -0.11  
Apple Citrus F&V 














You et al., 
1996 
Henneberry et 
al., 1999 Rickard et at, 2012 
Grain  (flour) -0.14      (cereal) 0.18 
Meat: beef  0.2      
Meat: pork  0.197      0.28 
Poultry  (chicken) -0.05       
Egg  -0.3      -0.05 
Dairy  
(cheese) 0.15; 
(milk) -0.25      -0.05 
Fruits -0.59 -0.2 -0.7 -0.24 -0.122 -0.165 -1.028 
Veg.        -0.63 
Fish  0.133       
Sweets  0.11       
Fat  -0.3       
Other 
Food    -0.31    -0.12 
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          Table 4.5 Literatures on Own-Price & Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand for Non-Horticultural Products 
Dairy Egg 
1970~99 1960~1993 1938~2007 
1989~91; 







You et al., 
1996 
Andreyeva et 




al, 2008 Rickard et at, 2012 
Grain -0.097 (flour) 0.0067  (cereal) 0.13 
(cereal) -
0.096  (cereal) 0.23 
Meat: beef  -0.1  
Meat: pork -0.2 0.0047  0.02 -0.067  0.96 
Poultry     -0.06   
Egg  -0.015  0.08 -0.057 -0.27 -0.74 
Dairy -0.303 -0.19 -0.94 -0.092  0.66 
Fruits -0.086 -0.04 -0.068  
Veg. -0.15 -0.02 
                -0.65 
*Cheese: -0.44  
*Milk: -0.59 -0.07 -0.062  -0.48 
Fish        
Fats  -0.035      
Sweetner  0.038      
Food other    0.24  -0.53  
Meat Oil & Fats Poultry 
1970~99 1960~93 
1989~91; 1994~96; 

















Grain -0.058 0.0371 (cereal) 0.03    (cereal) -0.04  
Meat: beef    -0.06 0.1 
Meat: pork -0.447 -0.44 -0.51    -0.008 0.14 
Poultry      -0.17 -0.64 -0.42 
Egg  0.0137 0.05    -0.017 0.02 
Dairy -0.21 0.003 0.01    -0.03 0.01 
Fruits -0.048 0.0085    -0.0001  
Veg.  -0.029 0.14    -0.09 -0.01 
Fish         
Fats  0.0129  -0.1 -0.48  -0.024  
Sweetner  -0.013       
Food other   -0.09      
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         Table 4.6 Literatures on Own-Price & Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand for Non-Horticultural Products (cont’d)  
Poultry Fish Grain 



















et al, 2008 
Rickard et at, 
2012 
Grain    (cereal) -0.12  -0.25 (cereal) -0.6 (cereal) -0.98 
Meat: beef  -0.1 -0.21 -0.044   





-0.04 -0.11     
Egg    0.001    0.02 
Dairy    -0.034  -0.09  0.11 
Fruits    -0.069  -0.44  
Veg.    -0.023  -0.137  0.17 
Fish  -0.2 -0.23 -0.39 -0.5    
Fats    -0.06     
Beef 








et al., 1985 
Moschini 
et al., 1994 
Huang and 
Lin, 2000 Hahn, 2001 
Dahlgran, 
1987 
Bryant and Davis, 
2001 
Grain     (cereal) -0.06    
Meat: beef -1.05 -0.45 -1.063 -0.84 -0.354 -0.83 -0.66 -0.6 




(chicken)       





Egg     -0.013    
Dairy     -0.07    
Fruits     -0.063    
Veg.     -0.067    
Fish -0.14 -0.4   -0.0071    
Fats     -0.024    
  88 
               Table 4.7 Literatures on Own-Price & Cross-Price Elasticity of  
                               Demand for Non-Horticultural Products (cont’d)  
Beef Pork Sweets 











et al, 2008 
Andreyeva 
et al, 2008 
Andreyeva 
et al, 2008 
Grain      
Meat: beef -0.45 -0.98 -0.75   
Meat: pork 0.1 -0.12  -0.72  
Poultry  
(chicken)  
-0.03    
Egg      
Dairy      
Fruits      
Veg.      
Fish  -0.12    
Fats      
Sweets     -0.34 
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Table 5.1 Nutrient- and Caloric-Intake Level  
              Contributed from Horticultural and Non-Horticultural Products, per capita per day 




Fats (g) 9.1 170.1 
Fiber (g) 12.6 12.4 
Vitamin A (mg) 315.4 764.6 
Vitamin C (mg) 106.6 12.4 
Calcium (mg) 134.8 834.2 
Iron (mg) 4.7 18.7 
Sodium (mg) 386.9 853.1 
Source: Food Availability, USDA 
Note: Caloric-Intake Level and Nutrient-Intake level use one-year data in 2004.  
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Table 5.2.1 Scenario I: Market and Welfare Effects (million US$) of a 10% Increase in Government Promotional Expenditures for  




























            
0 0 0 0.0057 0.0000 -0.0025 901.69 -684.89 0.00 -684.89 0.00 -684.89 
 0.010 0.010 0.0055 0.0000 -0.0028 875.48 -664.93 0.00 -710.07 0.00 -755.21 
 0.015 0.045 0.0049 0.0000 -0.0037 782.38 -594.05 0.00 -799.49 0.00 -1004.93 
 0.030 0.030 0.0052 0.0000 -0.0033 822.55 -624.62 0.00 -760.92 0.00 -897.21 
 0.075 0.060 0.0047 0.0000 -0.0041 741.81 -563.17 0.00 -838.44 0.00 -1113.72 
 0.090 0.090 0.0042 0.0000 -0.0050 659.41 -500.49 0.00 -917.51 0.00 -1334.54 
 0.020 0.150 0.0031 0.0000 -0.0067 489.47 -371.30 0.00 -1080.47 0.00 -1789.64 
 0.200 0.020 0.0054 0.0000 -0.0031 849.10 -644.84 0.00 -735.41 0.00 -825.98 
0.2 0 0 0.0057 0.0011 -0.0026 905.11 -687.48 0.00 -687.48 0.00 -687.48 
 0.010 0.010 0.0056 0.0011 -0.0028 878.81 -667.45 -1.50 -718.97 -2.99 -770.50 
 0.015 0.045 0.0050 0.0010 -0.0037 785.39 -596.33 -6.81 -830.84 -13.63 -1065.35 
 0.030 0.030 0.0052 0.0010 -0.0033 825.70 -627.01 -4.52 -782.58 -9.04 -938.16 
 0.075 0.060 0.0047 0.0009 -0.0042 744.67 -565.34 -9.13 -879.57 -18.27 -1193.80 
 0.090 0.090 0.0042 0.0008 -0.0050 661.99 -502.44 -13.84 -978.50 -27.68 -1454.55 
 0.020 0.150 0.0031 0.0006 -0.0067 491.42 -372.78 -23.56 -1182.41 -47.12 -1992.03 
 0.200 0.020 0.0054 0.0011 -0.0031 852.34 -647.30 -3.00 -750.67 -6.01 -854.05 
-0.16 0 0 0.0057 -0.0009 -0.0026 903.87 -686.54 0.00 -686.54 0.00 -686.54 
 0.010 0.010 0.0055 -0.0009 -0.0028 877.61 -666.54 1.14 -715.57 2.28 -764.59 
 0.015 0.045 0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0037 784.30 -595.50 5.18 -818.65 10.37 -1041.79 
 0.030 0.030 0.0052 -0.0008 -0.0033 824.56 -626.15 3.44 -774.18 6.88 -922.21 
 0.075 0.060 0.0047 -0.0008 -0.0042 743.64 -564.56 6.95 -863.55 13.89 -1162.54 
 0.090 0.090 0.0042 -0.0007 -0.0050 661.06 -501.73 10.53 -954.70 21.06 -1407.67 
 0.020 0.150 0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0067 490.72 -372.25 17.92 -1142.58 35.84 -1912.92 
 0.200 0.020 0.0054 -0.0009 -0.0031 851.18 -646.41 2.28 -744.78 4.57 -843.15 
Note: % Change in price of H equals 0; Change in PS for H equals 0; Change in CS for H, , equals 0 
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Table 5.2.2 Scenario I: Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of a 10% Increase in Government Promotional Expenditures for   










Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 






0 0 0 204.20 0.00 204.20 0.00 204.20 0 -3229 -3229 -0.92 
 0.010 0.010 197.95 0.00 152.82 0.00 107.68 0 -3561 -3561 -1.02 
 0.015 0.045 175.73 0.00 -29.71 0.00 -235.15 0 -4740 -4740 -1.35 
 0.030 0.030 185.32 0.00 49.03 0.00 -87.26 0 -4231 -4231 -1.21 
 0.075 0.060 166.04 0.00 -109.24 0.00 -384.51 0 -5254 -5254 -1.50 
 0.090 0.090 146.32 0.00 -270.70 0.00 -687.73 0 -6299 -6299 -1.80 
 0.020 0.150 105.56 0.00 -603.61 0.00 -1312.77 0 -8454 -8454 -2.42 
 0.200 0.020 191.66 0.00 101.09 0.00 10.53 0 -3895 -3895 -1.11 
0.2 0 0 205.03 0.00 205.03 0.00 205.03 178 -3241 -3063 -0.88 
 0.010 0.010 198.76 -1.50 147.24 -2.99 95.72 172 -3572 -3400 -0.97 
 0.015 0.045 176.46 -6.81 -58.05 -13.63 -292.56 154 -4750 -4596 -1.31 
 0.030 0.030 186.09 -4.52 30.51 -9.04 -125.06 162 -4242 -4080 -1.17 
 0.075 0.060 166.73 -9.13 -147.50 -18.27 -461.73 146 -5264 -5118 -1.46 
 0.090 0.090 146.95 -13.84 -329.11 -27.68 -805.17 130 -6307 -6177 -1.76 
 0.020 0.150 106.04 -23.56 -703.59 -47.12 -1513.21 96 -8459 -8363 -2.39 
 0.200 0.020 192.45 -3.00 89.07 -6.01 -14.31 167 -3906 -3739 -1.07 
-0.16 0 0 204.73 0.00 204.73 0.00 204.73 -142 -3236 -3378 -0.97 
 0.010 0.010 198.47 1.14 149.44 2.28 100.42 -138 -3568 -3706 -1.06 
 0.015 0.045 176.20 5.18 -46.94 10.37 -270.08 -123 -4747 -4870 -1.39 
 0.030 0.030 185.81 3.44 37.78 6.88 -110.25 -129 -4238 -4368 -1.25 
 0.075 0.060 166.48 6.95 -132.51 13.89 -431.51 -117 -5260 -5377 -1.54 
 0.090 0.090 146.72 10.53 -306.25 21.06 -759.22 -104 -6304 -6408 -1.83 
 0.020 0.150 105.87 17.92 -664.47 35.84 -1434.80 -77 -8457 -8535 -2.44 
 0.200 0.020 192.16 2.28 93.80 4.57 -4.57 -134 -3902 -4036 -1.15 
 Note: Change in TS for H equals 0, for N equals $-12.6 million; Change in NS for H, , equals 0 
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Table 5.2.3 Scenario I: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of a 10% Increase in Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  











intake Fat (g) %  
Fiber 
(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None -3229 -158.2 -0.24 -11.5 -0.13 -711.2 -0.21 -11.5 -0.03 -776.0 -0.22 -17.4 -0.20 -793.5 -0.18 
 Es -3561 -174.5 -0.27 -12.7 -0.14 -784.3 -0.23 -12.7 -0.03 -855.7 -0.24 -19.2 -0.22 -875.1 -0.19 
 Nm -4740 -232.3 -0.36 -16.9 -0.19 -1044.2 -0.30 -16.9 -0.04 -1139.2 -0.32 -25.5 -0.30 -1165.0 -0.26 
 Em -4231 -207.4 -0.32 -15.1 -0.17 -932.1 -0.27 -15.1 -0.04 -1016.9 -0.29 -22.8 -0.27 -1040.0 -0.23 
 Hm -5254 -257.5 -0.40 -18.8 -0.21 -1157.5 -0.33 -18.8 -0.05 -1262.8 -0.36 -28.3 -0.33 -1291.4 -0.29 
 El -6299 -308.7 -0.47 -22.5 -0.25 -1387.5 -0.40 -22.5 -0.06 -1513.8 -0.43 -33.9 -0.40 -1548.1 -0.34 
 Nl -8454 -414.3 -0.64 -30.2 -0.34 -1862.3 -0.54 -30.2 -0.07 -2031.8 -0.57 -45.5 -0.53 -2077.8 -0.46 
 Hl -3895 -190.9 -0.29 -13.9 -0.15 -858.0 -0.25 -13.9 -0.03 -936.1 -0.26 -21.0 -0.24 -957.3 -0.21 
Sub. None -3063 -155.0 -0.24 -6.3 -0.07 -582.1 -0.17 33.0 0.08 -722.6 -0.20 -15.5 -0.18 -634.9 -0.14 
 Es -3400 -171.4 -0.26 -7.7 -0.09 -659.0 -0.19 30.5 0.07 -803.9 -0.23 -17.3 -0.20 -721.1 -0.16 
 Nm -4596 -229.5 -0.35 -12.4 -0.14 -932.0 -0.27 21.7 0.05 -1092.8 -0.31 -23.9 -0.28 -1027.2 -0.23 
 Em -4080 -204.4 -0.31 -10.4 -0.12 -814.2 -0.23 25.5 0.06 -968.1 -0.27 -21.1 -0.25 -895.1 -0.20 
 Hm -5118 -254.8 -0.39 -14.5 -0.16 -1051.1 -0.30 17.8 0.04 -1218.7 -0.34 -26.7 -0.31 -1160.7 -0.26 
 El -6177 -306.3 -0.47 -18.7 -0.21 -1292.9 -0.37 10.1 0.02 -1474.5 -0.42 -32.5 -0.38 -1431.8 -0.32 
 Nl -8363 -412.5 -0.63 -27.4 -0.30 -1791.9 -0.52 -6.0 -0.01 -2002.5 -0.56 -44.5 -0.52 -1991.3 -0.44 
 Hl -3739 -187.8 -0.29 -9.0 -0.10 -736.3 -0.21 28.0 0.07 -885.7 -0.25 -19.2 -0.22 -807.8 -0.18 
Com. None -3378 -161.6 -0.25 -15.8 -0.18 -818.2 -0.24 -47.1 -0.12 -822.8 -0.23 -19.0 -0.22 -924.6 -0.21 
 Es -3706 -177.8 -0.27 -16.8 -0.19 -888.2 -0.26 -47.3 -0.12 -901.2 -0.25 -20.7 -0.24 -1002.3 -0.22 
 Nm -4870 -235.2 -0.36 -20.6 -0.23 -1137.0 -0.33 -47.8 -0.12 -1179.8 -0.33 -26.9 -0.31 -1278.7 -0.28 
 Em -4368 -210.5 -0.32 -19.0 -0.21 -1029.6 -0.30 -47.6 -0.12 -1059.6 -0.30 -24.3 -0.28 -1159.5 -0.26 
 Hm -5377 -260.3 -0.40 -22.3 -0.25 -1245.4 -0.36 -48.1 -0.12 -1301.3 -0.37 -29.6 -0.35 -1399.2 -0.31 
 El -6408 -311.2 -0.48 -25.6 -0.29 -1465.7 -0.42 -48.6 -0.12 -1548.0 -0.44 -35.1 -0.41 -1643.9 -0.36 
 Nl -8535 -416.1 -0.64 -32.5 -0.36 -1920.2 -0.55 -49.5 -0.12 -2057.1 -0.58 -46.4 -0.54 -2148.8 -0.48 
 Hl -4036 -194.1 -0.30 -17.9 -0.20 -958.7 -0.28 -47.4 -0.12 -980.1 -0.28 -22.5 -0.26 -1080.6 -0.24 
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Table 5.3.1 Scenario II: Market and Welfare Effects (million US$) of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for       




























            
0 0 0 -0.0215 0.0155 0.0000 -507.39 272.37 272.37 0.00 272.37 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0208 0.0147 0.0000 -490.08 263.26 261.03 0.00 258.80 0.00 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0144 0.0000 -481.38 258.70 255.41 0.00 252.12 0.00 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0132 0.0000 -455.17 244.95 238.72 0.00 232.49 0.00 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0101 0.0000 -375.32 203.23 190.31 0.00 177.39 0.00 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0092 0.0000 -348.29 189.16 174.73 0.00 160.30 0.00 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0201 0.0140 0.0000 -472.67 254.12 249.81 0.00 245.51 0.00 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.0032 0.0000 -143.41 83.34 69.21 0.00 55.09 0.00 
0.2 0 0 -0.0216 0.0156 -0.0043 -509.37 273.41 273.41 0.00 273.41 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0148 -0.0042 -492.00 264.27 261.71 -10.86 259.15 -21.72 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0144 -0.0041 -483.27 259.69 255.92 -16.01 252.15 -32.02 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0195 0.0133 -0.0039 -456.97 245.89 238.75 -30.34 231.61 -60.68 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0162 0.0102 -0.0032 -376.83 204.01 189.21 -63.05 174.40 -126.10 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0151 0.0092 -0.0030 -349.70 189.89 173.35 -70.47 156.82 -140.93 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0140 -0.0040 -474.53 255.09 250.16 -20.97 245.22 -41.95 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0067 0.0032 -0.0013 -144.05 83.67 67.48 -69.26 51.28 -138.53 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0216 0.0155 0.0035 -508.66 273.04 273.04 0.00 273.04 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0148 0.0033 -491.30 263.91 261.48 8.29 259.05 16.57 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0144 0.0033 -482.59 259.33 255.75 12.21 252.17 24.43 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0133 0.0031 -456.32 245.55 238.76 23.14 231.98 46.28 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0101 0.0026 -376.29 203.73 189.66 48.06 175.59 96.12 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0092 0.0024 -349.19 189.63 173.91 53.70 158.20 107.41 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0140 0.0032 -473.86 254.74 250.05 16.00 245.36 32.00 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.0032 0.0011 -143.82 83.55 68.17 52.71 52.78 105.41 
Note: % Change in price of N equals 0; Change in PS for N equals 0; Change in CS for N, , equals 0 
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     Table 5.3.2 Scenario II: Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for     










Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 





0 0 0 -222.80 -222.80 0.00 -222.80 0.00 2405 0 2405 0.69 
 0.010 0.010 -214.59 -216.82 0.00 -219.05 0.00 2286 0 2286 0.65 
 0.015 0.045 -210.47 -213.75 0.00 -217.04 0.00 2227 0 2227 0.64 
 0.030 0.030 -198.01 -204.23 0.00 -210.46 0.00 2055 0 2055 0.59 
 0.075 0.060 -159.87 -172.79 0.00 -185.71 0.00 1570 0 1570 0.45 
 0.090 0.090 -146.91 -161.33 0.00 -175.76 0.00 1420 0 1420 0.41 
 0.020 0.150 -206.33 -210.63 0.00 -214.94 0.00 2169 0 2169 0.62 
 0.200 0.020 -47.85 -61.97 0.00 -76.10 0.00 489 0 489 0.14 
0.2 0 0 -223.74 -223.74 0.00 -223.74 0.00 2414 -5476 -3062 -0.87 
 0.010 0.010 -215.51 -218.06 -10.86 -220.62 -21.72 2294 -5295 -3000 -0.86 
 0.015 0.045 -211.37 -215.14 -16.01 -218.91 -32.02 2236 -5204 -2968 -0.85 
 0.030 0.030 -198.87 -206.00 -30.34 -213.14 -60.68 2063 -4930 -2867 -0.82 
 0.075 0.060 -160.60 -175.41 -63.05 -190.21 -126.10 1576 -4097 -2521 -0.72 
 0.090 0.090 -147.59 -164.13 -70.47 -180.66 -140.93 1425 -3815 -2390 -0.68 
 0.020 0.150 -207.21 -212.15 -20.97 -217.09 -41.95 2177 -5113 -2935 -0.84 
 0.200 0.020 -48.16 -64.36 -69.26 -80.55 -138.53 491 -1686 -1195 -0.34 
-0.16 0 0 -223.40 -223.40 0.00 -223.40 0.00 2410 4375 6785 1.94 
 0.010 0.010 -215.18 -217.61 8.29 -220.04 16.57 2291 4230 6521 1.86 
 0.015 0.045 -211.04 -214.62 12.21 -218.20 24.43 2232 4157 6390 1.83 
 0.030 0.030 -198.56 -205.34 23.14 -212.12 46.28 2060 3939 5998 1.71 
 0.075 0.060 -160.34 -174.41 48.06 -188.47 96.12 1574 3273 4847 1.38 
 0.090 0.090 -147.34 -163.06 53.70 -178.77 107.41 1423 3048 4471 1.28 
 0.020 0.150 -206.89 -211.58 16.00 -216.27 32.00 2174 4085 6259 1.79 
 0.200 0.020 -48.05 -63.43 52.71 -78.82 105.41 491 1347 1838 0.53 
Note: Change in TS for N equals 0, for H equals $12.22 million; Change in NS for N, , equals 0 
  95 
Table 5.3.3 Scenario II: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for    
                                        Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  











intake Fat (g) % 
Fiber 
(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None 2405 51.5 0.08 71.3 0.79 1784.5 0.51 603.1 1.48 762.7 0.21 26.6 0.31 2189.0 0.49 
 Es 2286 48.9 0.08 67.8 0.75 1696.2 0.49 573.3 1.41 725.0 0.20 25.3 0.29 2080.8 0.46 
 Nm 2227 47.7 0.07 66.0 0.74 1652.7 0.48 558.6 1.37 706.4 0.20 24.6 0.29 2027.4 0.45 
 Em 2055 44.0 0.07 60.9 0.68 1524.9 0.44 515.4 1.27 651.7 0.18 22.7 0.26 1870.6 0.42 
 Hm 1570 33.6 0.05 46.6 0.52 1165.3 0.34 393.9 0.97 498.1 0.14 17.4 0.20 1429.5 0.32 
 El 1420 30.4 0.05 42.1 0.47 1053.6 0.30 356.1 0.88 450.3 0.13 15.7 0.18 1292.4 0.29 
 Nl 2169 46.4 0.07 64.3 0.72 1609.7 0.46 544.1 1.34 688.0 0.19 24.0 0.28 1974.6 0.44 
 Hl 489 10.5 0.02 14.5 0.16 363.2 0.10 122.7 0.30 155.2 0.04 5.4 0.06 445.5 0.10 
Sub. None -3062 -216.7 -0.33 52.0 0.58 585.0 0.17 585.8 1.44 -550.4 -0.16 -2.8 -0.03 851.5 0.19 
 Es -3000 -210.3 -0.32 49.1 0.55 536.3 0.15 556.6 1.37 -544.8 -0.15 -3.2 -0.04 787.3 0.17 
 Nm -2968 -207.2 -0.32 47.7 0.53 512.7 0.15 542.1 1.33 -541.6 -0.15 -3.3 -0.04 756.1 0.17 
 Em -2867 -197.4 -0.30 43.5 0.48 444.7 0.13 499.7 1.23 -530.6 -0.15 -3.8 -0.04 666.0 0.15 
 Hm -2521 -167.0 -0.26 32.1 0.36 267.4 0.08 380.7 0.94 -484.6 -0.14 -4.6 -0.05 428.1 0.10 
 El -2390 -156.4 -0.24 28.6 0.32 217.2 0.06 343.8 0.85 -464.9 -0.13 -4.8 -0.06 359.7 0.08 
 Nl -2935 -203.9 -0.31 46.3 0.52 489.6 0.14 527.9 1.30 -538.2 -0.15 -3.5 -0.04 725.5 0.16 
 Hl -1195 -72.1 -0.11 8.5 0.10 -6.8 0.00 117.2 0.29 -249.4 -0.07 -3.7 -0.04 32.8 0.01 
Com. None 6785 266.0 0.41 87.1 0.97 2752.5 0.79 620.2 1.53 1815.9 0.51 50.2 0.59 3269.5 0.73 
 Es 6521 256.4 0.39 83.0 0.92 2632.1 0.76 589.8 1.45 1743.3 0.49 48.1 0.56 3125.4 0.69 
 Nm 6390 251.5 0.39 81.0 0.90 2572.6 0.74 574.8 1.41 1707.3 0.48 47.1 0.55 3054.1 0.68 
 Em 5998 237.1 0.36 75.1 0.84 2396.2 0.69 530.7 1.31 1599.9 0.45 44.0 0.51 2843.2 0.63 
 Hm 4847 194.1 0.30 58.4 0.65 1889.2 0.54 406.5 1.00 1285.9 0.36 35.0 0.41 2237.4 0.50 
 El 4471 179.8 0.28 53.1 0.59 1727.6 0.50 367.9 0.90 1183.9 0.33 32.2 0.37 2044.7 0.45 
 Nl 6259 246.7 0.38 79.1 0.88 2513.4 0.72 560.0 1.38 1671.3 0.47 46.1 0.54 2983.3 0.66 
 Hl 1838 76.5 0.12 19.4 0.22 660.8 0.19 127.9 0.31 479.3 0.14 12.7 0.15 777.7 0.17 
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Table 5.4.1 Scenario III: Market and Welfare Effects (million US$) of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for       




























            
0 0 0 -0.0215 0.0155 0.0000 -526.94 272.37 272.37 0.00 272.37 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0208 0.0187 0.0000 -509.63 263.78 296.66 0.00 329.53 0.00 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0203 0.0000 -500.93 259.47 308.87 0.00 358.28 0.00 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0252 0.0000 -474.72 246.40 345.80 0.00 445.21 0.00 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0400 0.0000 -394.87 206.25 459.24 0.00 712.23 0.00 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0451 0.0000 -367.84 192.54 497.96 0.00 803.38 0.00 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0201 0.0220 0.0000 -492.22 255.13 321.14 0.00 387.14 0.00 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.0830 0.0000 -162.96 86.66 796.49 0.00 1506.33 0.00 
0.2 0 0 -0.0216 0.0156 -0.0043 -528.92 273.41 273.41 0.00 273.41 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0188 -0.0042 -511.55 264.79 302.32 159.06 339.85 318.12 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0204 -0.0041 -502.82 260.46 316.86 238.88 373.27 477.76 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0195 0.0253 -0.0039 -476.52 247.35 360.83 479.50 474.32 959.00 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0162 0.0401 -0.0032 -396.38 207.05 495.89 1211.97 784.74 2423.94 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0151 0.0451 -0.0030 -369.25 193.29 541.99 1459.73 890.70 2919.45 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0220 -0.0040 -494.08 256.10 331.46 318.89 406.82 637.79 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0067 0.0830 -0.0013 -163.60 87.00 897.52 3334.03 1708.04 6668.06 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0216 0.0155 0.0035 -528.21 273.04 273.04 0.00 273.04 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0188 0.0033 -510.85 264.43 300.14 -121.53 335.85 -243.06 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0204 0.0033 -502.14 260.10 313.77 -182.51 367.44 -365.01 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0252 0.0031 -475.87 247.01 354.98 -366.27 462.96 -732.53 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0401 0.0026 -395.84 206.76 481.58 -925.20 756.40 -1850.40 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0451 0.0024 -368.74 193.02 524.79 -1114.11 856.57 -2228.21 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0220 0.0032 -493.41 255.75 327.45 -243.62 399.15 -487.24 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.0830 0.0011 -163.37 86.88 858.02 -2540.69 1629.16 -5081.37 
Note: % Change in price of N equals 0; Change in PS for N equals 0; Change in CS for N, , equals 0 
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 Table 5.4.2 Scenario III: Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for     










Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 





0 0 0 -242.35 -242.35 0.00 -242.35 0.00 2405 0 2405 0.69 
 0.010 0.010 -233.62 -200.75 0.00 -167.87 0.00 2905 0 2905 0.83 
 0.015 0.045 -229.25 -179.84 0.00 -130.43 0.00 3155 0 3155 0.90 
 0.030 0.030 -216.10 -116.70 0.00 -17.30 0.00 3912 0 3912 1.12 
 0.075 0.060 -176.40 76.59 0.00 329.58 0.00 6212 0 6212 1.77 
 0.090 0.090 -163.08 142.34 0.00 447.76 0.00 6990 0 6990 2.00 
 0.020 0.150 -224.87 -158.86 0.00 -92.86 0.00 3407 0 3407 0.97 
 0.200 0.020 -64.08 645.76 0.00 1355.59 0.00 12868 0 12868 3.68 
0.2 0 0 -243.29 -243.29 0.00 -243.29 0.00 2414 -5476 -3062 -0.87 
 0.010 0.010 -234.53 -197.00 159.06 -159.47 318.12 2913 -5295 -2381 -0.68 
 0.015 0.045 -230.15 -173.74 238.88 -117.33 477.76 3164 -5204 -2040 -0.58 
 0.030 0.030 -216.95 -103.47 479.50 10.02 959.00 3919 -4930 -1011 -0.29 
 0.075 0.060 -177.11 111.73 1211.97 400.58 2423.94 6218 -4097 2121 0.61 
 0.090 0.090 -163.75 184.96 1459.73 533.67 2919.45 6995 -3815 3180 0.91 
 0.020 0.150 -225.75 -150.40 318.89 -75.04 637.79 3415 -5113 -1698 -0.49 
 0.200 0.020 -64.38 746.14 3334.03 1556.65 6668.06 12870 -1686 11184 3.20 
-0.16 0 0 -242.95 -242.95 0.00 -242.95 0.00 2410 4375 6785 1.94 
 0.010 0.010 -234.20 -198.49 -121.53 -162.79 -243.06 2910 4230 7140 2.04 
 0.015 0.045 -229.82 -176.15 -182.51 -122.48 -365.01 3161 4157 7318 2.09 
 0.030 0.030 -216.65 -108.67 -366.27 -0.69 -732.53 3917 3939 7855 2.24 
 0.075 0.060 -176.86 97.97 -925.20 372.79 -1850.40 6216 3273 9489 2.71 
 0.090 0.090 -163.50 168.27 -1114.11 500.05 -2228.21 6993 3048 10041 2.87 
 0.020 0.150 -225.43 -153.73 -243.62 -82.03 -487.24 3412 4085 7497 2.14 
 0.200 0.020 -64.27 706.87 -2540.69 1478.01 -5081.37 12869 1347 14216 4.06 
 Note: Change in TS for N equals 0, for H equals $12.22 million; Change in NS for N, , equals 0 
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   Table 5.4.3 Scenario III: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for    
                                    Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  















(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None 2405 51.5 0.08 71.3 0.79 1784.5 0.51 603.1 1.48 762.7 0.21 26.6 0.31 2189.0 0.49 
 Es 2905 62.2 0.10 86.1 0.96 2155.5 0.62 728.5 1.79 921.3 0.26 32.1 0.37 2644.2 0.59 
 Nm 3155 67.6 0.10 93.5 1.04 2341.7 0.68 791.5 1.95 1000.8 0.28 34.9 0.41 2872.6 0.64 
 Em 3912 83.8 0.13 116.0 1.29 2902.8 0.84 981.1 2.41 1240.7 0.35 43.3 0.50 3560.9 0.79 
 Hm 6212 133.0 0.20 184.2 2.05 4610.2 1.33 1558.2 3.83 1970.4 0.56 68.7 0.80 5655.3 1.26 
 El 6990 149.7 0.23 207.2 2.31 5187.4 1.50 1753.3 4.31 2217.1 0.62 77.3 0.90 6363.4 1.41 
 Nl 3407 72.9 0.11 101.0 1.12 2528.3 0.73 854.5 2.10 1080.6 0.30 37.7 0.44 3101.5 0.69 
 Hl 12868 275.5 0.42 381.5 4.25 9549.4 2.75 3227.5 7.94 4081.4 1.15 142.3 1.66 11714.2 2.60 
Sub. None -3062 -216.7 -0.33 52.0 0.58 585.0 0.17 585.8 1.44 -550.4 -0.16 -2.8 -0.03 851.5 0.19 
 Es -2381 -197.1 -0.30 67.5 0.75 995.6 0.29 711.8 1.75 -348.5 -0.10 3.7 0.04 1350.8 0.30 
 Nm -2040 -187.3 -0.29 75.2 0.84 1201.7 0.35 775.0 1.91 -247.1 -0.07 7.0 0.08 1601.3 0.36 
 Em -1011 -157.7 -0.24 98.6 1.10 1822.7 0.53 965.5 2.37 58.3 0.02 16.8 0.20 2356.3 0.52 
 Hm 2121 -67.6 -0.10 169.7 1.89 3712.2 1.07 1545.0 3.80 987.7 0.28 46.7 0.54 4653.9 1.03 
 El 3180 -37.2 -0.06 193.8 2.16 4351.1 1.25 1741.0 4.28 1301.9 0.37 56.8 0.66 5430.7 1.21 
 Nl -1698 -177.4 -0.27 83.0 0.92 1408.2 0.41 838.3 2.06 -145.6 -0.04 10.2 0.12 1852.4 0.41 
 Hl 11184 192.9 0.30 375.5 4.18 9179.4 2.65 3222.0 7.92 3676.7 1.04 133.2 1.55 11301.6 2.51 
Com. None 6785 266.0 0.41 87.1 0.97 2752.5 0.79 620.2 1.53 1815.9 0.51 50.2 0.59 3269.5 0.73 
 Es 7140 269.6 0.41 101.4 1.13 3091.4 0.89 745.0 1.83 1939.6 0.55 55.0 0.64 3688.9 0.82 
 Nm 7318 271.4 0.42 108.6 1.21 3261.5 0.94 807.7 1.99 2001.7 0.56 57.4 0.67 3899.3 0.87 
 Em 7855 276.9 0.42 130.2 1.45 3774.2 1.09 996.4 2.45 2188.8 0.62 64.5 0.75 4533.5 1.01 
 Hm 9489 293.5 0.45 196.0 2.18 5334.0 1.54 1570.8 3.86 2758.2 0.78 86.4 1.01 6463.2 1.43 
 El 10041 299.1 0.46 218.2 2.43 5861.4 1.69 1765.0 4.34 2950.7 0.83 93.8 1.09 7115.6 1.58 
 Nl 7497 273.2 0.42 115.8 1.29 3432.0 0.99 870.4 2.14 2063.9 0.58 59.7 0.70 4110.2 0.91 
 Hl 14216 341.6 0.52 386.3 4.30 9847.0 2.84 3232.7 7.95 4405.5 1.24 149.6 1.74 12046.4 2.67 
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   Table 5.5.1 Scenario IV(a): Market and Welfare Effects (million US$) of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for         




























            
0 0 0 -0.0215 0.0155 0.0000 -526.94 272.37 272.37 0.00 272.37 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0208 0.0201 0.0001 -509.63 263.96 308.63 15.74 353.29 31.48 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0223 0.0005 -500.93 259.72 326.86 70.84 393.99 141.67 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0292 0.0004 -474.72 246.89 381.96 47.22 517.03 94.44 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0501 0.0007 -394.87 207.26 551.09 94.46 894.92 188.91 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0571 0.0011 -367.84 193.67 608.77 141.71 1023.86 283.42 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0201 0.0246 0.0018 -492.22 255.47 345.15 236.26 434.84 472.53 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.1097 0.0002 -162.96 87.77 1052.57 31.48 2017.38 62.96 
0.2 0 0 -0.0216 0.0156 -0.0043 -528.92 273.41 273.41 0.00 273.41 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0201 -0.0041 -511.55 264.97 316.49 233.94 368.01 467.88 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0224 -0.0036 -502.82 260.72 339.73 405.09 418.75 810.18 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0195 0.0293 -0.0035 -476.52 247.84 403.64 704.25 559.44 1408.49 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0162 0.0501 -0.0025 -396.38 208.07 603.84 1747.41 999.62 3494.82 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0151 0.0571 -0.0020 -369.25 194.42 673.19 2135.01 1151.97 4270.03 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0247 -0.0023 -494.08 256.44 366.76 702.39 477.07 1404.79 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0067 0.1097 -0.0011 -163.60 88.12 1190.89 4510.70 2293.66 9021.40 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0216 0.0155 0.0035 -528.21 273.04 273.04 0.00 273.04 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0201 0.0035 -510.85 264.60 312.72 -147.91 360.84 -295.82 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0224 0.0038 -502.14 260.36 331.48 -170.73 402.60 -341.45 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0293 0.0035 -475.87 247.50 393.02 -445.44 538.54 -890.88 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0501 0.0033 -395.84 207.78 578.85 -1148.96 949.91 -2297.93 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0571 0.0035 -368.74 194.15 641.41 -1352.02 1088.67 -2704.03 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0247 0.0050 -493.41 256.09 347.50 -73.80 438.91 -147.59 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.1097 0.0013 -163.37 87.99 1135.30 -3375.75 2182.60 -6751.50 
Note: % Change in price of N equals 0; Change in PS for N equals 0; Change in CS for N, , equals 0  
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     Table 5.5.2 Scenario IV(a): Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for   










Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 





0 0 0 -248.90 -248.90 -6.55 -248.90 -6.55 2405 0 2405 0.69 
 0.010 0.010 -240.00 -195.33 9.19 -150.66 24.93 3112 148 3260 0.93 
 0.015 0.045 -235.54 -168.41 64.29 -101.27 135.12 3466 667 4133 1.18 
 0.030 0.030 -222.16 -87.09 40.67 47.98 87.89 4534 445 4978 1.42 
 0.075 0.060 -181.94 161.89 87.91 505.72 182.36 7767 889 8656 2.47 
 0.090 0.090 -168.50 246.60 135.16 661.69 276.87 8856 1334 10190 2.91 
 0.020 0.150 -231.08 -141.39 229.71 -51.71 465.98 3822 2223 6044 1.73 
 0.200 0.020 -69.52 895.29 24.93 1860.09 56.41 17015 296 17311 4.95 
0.2 0 0 -249.84 -249.84 -6.55 -249.84 -6.55 2414 -5476 -3062 -0.87 
 0.010 0.010 -240.91 -189.38 227.39 -137.86 461.33 3121 -5147 -2026 -0.58 
 0.015 0.045 -236.44 -157.42 398.54 -78.40 803.63 3475 -4537 -1062 -0.30 
 0.030 0.030 -223.01 -67.21 697.70 88.59 1401.94 4541 -4485 56 0.02 
 0.075 0.060 -182.65 213.13 1740.86 608.91 3488.27 7773 -3208 4566 1.30 
 0.090 0.090 -169.16 309.61 2128.46 788.39 4263.48 8862 -2481 6380 1.82 
 0.020 0.150 -231.96 -121.65 695.84 -11.34 1398.24 3830 -2890 940 0.27 
 0.200 0.020 -69.81 1032.96 4504.15 2135.73 9014.85 17017 -1390 15627 4.46 
-0.16 0 0 -249.50 -249.50 -6.55 -249.50 -6.55 2410 4375 6785 1.94 
 0.010 0.010 -240.58 -192.46 -154.46 -144.34 -302.37 3117 4378 7496 2.14 
 0.015 0.045 -236.11 -164.99 -177.28 -93.87 -348.00 3472 4824 8296 2.37 
 0.030 0.030 -222.71 -77.19 -451.99 68.34 -897.43 4539 4383 8922 2.55 
 0.075 0.060 -182.39 188.68 -1155.51 559.75 -2304.48 7771 4162 11933 3.41 
 0.090 0.090 -168.92 278.34 -1358.57 725.60 -2710.58 8860 4382 13241 3.78 
 0.020 0.150 -231.65 -140.24 -80.35 -48.83 -154.14 3827 6307 10134 2.90 
 0.200 0.020 -69.71 977.60 -3382.30 2024.90 -6758.05 17016 1643 18660 5.33 
Note: Change in TS for N equals -$6.55 million, for H equals $5.67 million; Change in NS for N, , equals -$6.55 million 
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Table 5.5.3 Scenario IV(a): Caloric and Nutritional Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  















(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calciu
m (mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None 2405 51.5 0.08 71.3 0.79 1784.5 0.51 603.1 1.48 762.7 0.21 26.6 0.31 2189.0 0.49 
 Es 3260 73.9 0.11 92.8 1.03 2342.1 0.68 781.1 1.92 1022.6 0.29 35.2 0.41 2869.4 0.64 
 Nm 4133 106.9 0.16 105.2 1.17 2719.4 0.78 871.9 2.14 1259.7 0.36 41.9 0.49 3319.6 0.74 
 Em 4978 118.9 0.18 136.0 1.51 3462.4 1.00 1138.7 2.80 1544.8 0.44 52.5 0.61 4236.5 0.94 
 Hm 8656 209.9 0.32 233.5 2.60 5960.2 1.72 1951.4 4.80 2677.3 0.75 90.7 1.06 7289.6 1.62 
 El 10190 255.0 0.39 267.3 2.98 6866.1 1.98 2226.1 5.47 3129.5 0.88 105.1 1.23 8390.1 1.86 
 Nl 6044 190.8 0.29 121.2 1.35 3325.7 0.96 966.5 2.38 1746.3 0.49 54.2 0.63 4025.3 0.89 
 Hl 17311 378.8 0.58 505.5 5.63 12692.4 3.66 4268.8 10.50 5468.0 1.54 189.8 2.21 15562.5 3.46 
Sub. None -3062 -216.7 -0.33 52.0 0.58 585.0 0.17 585.8 1.44 -550.4 -0.16 -2.8 -0.03 851.5 0.19 
 Es -2026 -185.4 -0.28 74.1 0.83 1182.2 0.34 764.3 1.88 -247.1 -0.07 6.8 0.08 1575.9 0.35 
 Nm -1062 -147.9 -0.23 86.8 0.97 1579.4 0.46 855.4 2.10 11.8 0.00 14.0 0.16 2048.3 0.45 
 Em 56 -122.6 -0.19 118.6 1.32 2382.2 0.69 1123.1 2.76 362.4 0.10 26.1 0.30 3031.9 0.67 
 Hm 4566 9.2 0.01 219.0 2.44 5062.2 1.46 1938.3 4.77 1694.6 0.48 68.7 0.80 6288.2 1.40 
 El 6380 68.1 0.10 253.9 2.83 6029.8 1.74 2213.9 5.44 2214.3 0.62 84.6 0.99 7457.4 1.66 
 Nl 940 -59.6 -0.09 103.2 1.15 2205.6 0.64 950.3 2.34 520.2 0.15 26.8 0.31 2776.2 0.62 
 Hl 15627 296.3 0.45 499.5 5.56 12322.4 3.55 4263.3 10.48 5063.4 1.43 180.7 2.11 15149.8 3.36 
Com. None 6785 266.0 0.41 87.1 0.97 2752.5 0.79 620.2 1.53 1815.9 0.51 50.2 0.59 3269.5 0.73 
 Es 7496 281.3 0.43 108.1 1.20 3278.0 0.95 797.6 1.96 2041.0 0.58 58.1 0.68 3914.1 0.87 
 Nm 8296 310.8 0.48 120.2 1.34 3639.2 1.05 888.1 2.18 2260.6 0.64 64.4 0.75 4346.3 0.96 
 Em 8922 312.0 0.48 150.2 1.67 4333.8 1.25 1154.1 2.84 2493.0 0.70 73.8 0.86 5209.1 1.16 
 Hm 11933 370.4 0.57 245.3 2.73 6684.0 1.93 1964.1 4.83 3465.1 0.98 108.4 1.26 8097.5 1.80 
 El 13241 404.4 0.62 278.3 3.10 7540.1 2.17 2237.9 5.50 3863.1 1.09 121.6 1.42 9142.4 2.03 
 Nl 10134 391.0 0.60 136.0 1.51 4229.4 1.22 982.4 2.42 2729.7 0.77 76.3 0.89 5034.1 1.12 
 Hl 18660 444.9 0.68 510.4 5.68 12990.0 3.75 4273.9 10.51 5792.1 1.63 197.0 2.30 15894.7 3.53 
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Table 5.6.1 Scenario IV(b): Market and Welfare Effects (million US$) of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional   




























            
0 0 0 -0.0215 0.0155 0.0000 -526.94 272.37 272.37 0.00 272.37 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0208 0.0211 0.0000 -509.63 264.10 318.21 3.15 372.32 6.29 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0240 0.0001 -500.93 259.93 341.27 14.16 422.60 28.33 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0324 0.0001 -474.72 247.28 410.99 9.44 574.69 18.89 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0581 0.0001 -394.87 208.08 625.20 18.89 1042.32 37.77 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0667 0.0002 -367.84 194.58 698.32 28.33 1202.06 56.66 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0201 0.0268 0.0004 -492.22 255.74 364.41 47.22 473.09 94.44 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.1311 0.0000 -162.96 88.66 1261.92 6.29 2435.19 12.59 
0.2 0 0 -0.0216 0.0156 -0.0043 -528.92 273.41 273.41 0.00 273.41 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0212 -0.0042 -511.55 265.11 327.00 265.13 388.88 530.25 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0240 -0.0040 -502.82 260.92 354.27 408.76 447.61 817.52 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0195 0.0325 -0.0038 -476.52 248.23 435.46 797.76 622.70 1595.51 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0162 0.0581 -0.0031 -396.38 208.88 685.80 2002.56 1162.72 4005.12 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0151 0.0668 -0.0028 -369.25 195.33 771.48 2415.09 1347.63 4830.18 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0268 -0.0037 -494.08 256.71 382.39 577.76 508.06 1155.52 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0067 0.1311 -0.0013 -163.60 89.01 1428.95 5393.75 2768.89 10787.49 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0216 0.0155 0.0035 -528.21 273.04 273.04 0.00 273.04 0.00 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0209 0.0212 0.0034 -510.85 264.74 323.45 -196.40 382.15 -392.79 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0205 0.0240 0.0034 -502.14 260.56 348.56 -284.54 436.56 -569.07 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0194 0.0325 0.0032 -475.87 247.89 425.48 -590.85 603.08 -1181.70 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0161 0.0581 0.0027 -395.84 208.59 661.24 -1491.70 1113.89 -2983.40 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0150 0.0667 0.0026 -368.74 195.06 741.56 -1787.75 1288.06 -3575.49 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0202 0.0268 0.0036 -493.41 256.36 373.22 -348.87 490.07 -697.75 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0066 0.1311 0.0011 -163.37 88.89 1363.33 -4097.92 2637.78 -8195.85 
Note: % Change in price of N equals 0; Change in PS for N equals 0; Change in CS for N, , equals 0 
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     Table 5.6.2 Scenario IV(b): Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures 










Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 





0 0 0 -254.14 -254.14 -1.31 -254.14 -1.31 2405 0 2405 0.69 
 0.010 0.010 -245.10 -190.98 1.84 -136.87 4.98 3278 30 3307 0.94 
 0.015 0.045 -240.57 -159.24 12.85 -77.90 27.02 3715 133 3849 1.10 
 0.030 0.030 -227.01 -63.31 8.13 100.40 17.58 5031 89 5120 1.46 
 0.075 0.060 -186.36 230.76 17.58 647.88 36.46 9012 178 9189 2.63 
 0.090 0.090 -172.83 330.91 27.02 834.65 55.35 10349 267 10616 3.03 
 0.020 0.150 -236.05 -127.37 45.91 -18.70 93.13 4153 445 4598 1.31 
 0.200 0.020 -73.87 1099.40 4.98 2272.66 11.28 20333 59 20392 5.83 
0.2 0 0 -255.08 -255.08 -1.31 -255.08 -1.31 2414 -5476 -3062 -0.87 
 0.010 0.010 -246.01 -184.12 263.82 -122.23 528.94 3286 -5265 -1979 -0.57 
 0.015 0.045 -241.47 -148.13 407.45 -54.78 816.21 3724 -5070 -1347 -0.38 
 0.030 0.030 -227.86 -40.63 796.45 146.61 1594.20 5039 -4841 198 0.06 
 0.075 0.060 -187.07 289.85 2001.25 766.76 4003.81 9018 -3919 5099 1.46 
 0.090 0.090 -173.49 402.66 2413.78 978.81 4828.87 10355 -3548 6806 1.94 
 0.020 0.150 -236.93 -111.26 576.45 14.41 1154.21 4162 -4668 -507 -0.14 
 0.200 0.020 -74.16 1265.78 5392.44 2605.72 10786.18 20335 -1627 18708 5.35 
-0.16 0 0 -254.74 -254.74 -1.31 -254.74 -1.31 2410 4375 6785 1.94 
 0.010 0.010 -245.68 -186.98 -197.71 -128.27 -394.10 3283 4260 7543 2.16 
 0.015 0.045 -241.15 -153.15 -285.85 -65.15 -570.38 3721 4291 8011 2.29 
 0.030 0.030 -227.56 -49.96 -592.16 127.64 -1183.01 5036 4028 9064 2.59 
 0.075 0.060 -186.82 265.83 -1493.01 718.49 -2984.71 9015 3451 12466 3.56 
 0.090 0.090 -173.25 373.25 -1789.06 919.75 -3576.80 10353 3315 13667 3.90 
 0.020 0.150 -236.62 -119.76 -350.18 -2.90 -699.06 4159 4529 8688 2.48 
 0.200 0.020 -74.05 1200.39 -4099.23 2474.84 -8197.16 20334 1406 21740 6.21 
Note: Change in TS for N equals -$1.31 million, for H equals 0.43 million; Change in NS for N, , equals -1.31 million
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      Table 5.6.3 Scenario IV(b): Caloric and Nutritional Effects of a 10% Decrease in Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  











intake Fat (g) % 
Fiber 
(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None 2405 51.5 0.08 71.3 0.79 1784.5 0.51 603.1 1.48 762.7 0.21 26.6 0.31 2189.0 0.49 
 Es 3307 71.6 0.11 97.3 1.08 2439.1 0.70 822.3 2.02 1046.8 0.30 36.4 0.42 2991.3 0.66 
 Nm 3849 86.1 0.13 110.6 1.23 2786.6 0.80 932.4 2.29 1210.5 0.34 41.8 0.49 3415.0 0.76 
 Em 5120 112.1 0.17 149.5 1.66 3753.4 1.08 1262.3 3.10 1617.2 0.46 56.1 0.65 4602.1 1.02 
 Hm 9189 201.7 0.31 267.8 2.98 6726.8 1.94 2260.9 5.56 2901.0 0.82 100.6 1.17 8247.4 1.83 
 El 10616 234.7 0.36 307.8 3.43 7739.1 2.23 2596.8 6.39 3346.6 0.94 115.9 1.35 9487.0 2.11 
 Nl 4598 110.7 0.17 124.7 1.39 3180.2 0.92 1043.4 2.57 1424.2 0.40 48.3 0.56 3890.3 0.86 
 Hl 20392 438.3 0.67 603.0 6.72 15102.4 4.36 5100.1 12.54 6463.3 1.82 225.2 2.63 18524.6 4.11 
Sub. None -3062 -216.7 -0.33 52.0 0.58 585.0 0.17 585.8 1.44 -550.4 -0.16 -2.8 -0.03 851.5 0.19 
 Es -1979 -187.7 -0.29 78.6 0.88 1279.2 0.37 805.5 1.98 -223.0 -0.06 8.0 0.09 1697.8 0.38 
 Nm -1347 -168.8 -0.26 92.3 1.03 1646.5 0.47 915.9 2.25 -37.5 -0.01 13.9 0.16 2143.7 0.48 
 Em 198 -129.3 -0.20 132.1 1.47 2673.2 0.77 1246.6 3.07 434.8 0.12 29.6 0.35 3397.6 0.75 
 Hm 5099 1.0 0.00 253.3 2.82 5828.8 1.68 2247.8 5.53 1918.3 0.54 78.6 0.92 7246.0 1.61 
 El 6806 47.8 0.07 294.3 3.28 6902.8 1.99 2584.5 6.36 2431.5 0.69 95.4 1.11 8554.3 1.90 
 Nl -507 -139.7 -0.21 106.7 1.19 2060.1 0.59 1027.2 2.53 198.0 0.06 20.9 0.24 2641.2 0.59 
 Hl 18708 355.7 0.55 597.1 6.65 14732.4 4.25 5094.6 12.53 6058.7 1.71 216.1 2.52 18111.9 4.02 
Comp. None 6785 266.0 0.41 87.1 0.97 2752.5 0.79 620.2 1.53 1815.9 0.51 50.2 0.59 3269.5 0.73 
 Es 7543 279.1 0.43 112.6 1.25 3375.0 0.97 838.8 2.06 2065.1 0.58 59.3 0.69 4036.0 0.90 
 Nm 8011 289.9 0.44 125.6 1.40 3706.4 1.07 948.6 2.33 2211.3 0.62 64.3 0.75 4441.8 0.99 
 Em 9064 305.2 0.47 163.7 1.82 4624.7 1.33 1277.6 3.14 2565.4 0.72 77.4 0.90 5574.7 1.24 
 Hm 12466 362.1 0.56 279.6 3.11 7450.6 2.15 2273.6 5.59 3688.8 1.04 118.3 1.38 9055.3 2.01 
 El 13667 384.1 0.59 318.8 3.55 8413.1 2.43 2608.6 6.42 4080.3 1.15 132.3 1.54 10239.3 2.27 
 Nl 8688 311.0 0.48 139.5 1.55 4083.9 1.18 1059.3 2.61 2407.6 0.68 70.4 0.82 4899.0 1.09 
 Hl 21740 504.3 0.77 607.9 6.77 15400.0 4.44 5105.3 12.56 6787.4 1.91 232.4 2.71 18856.7 4.19 
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0 0 0 -0.0037 0.0013 0.0026 -0.0006 -90 206 46 -157 46 -157 46 -157 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0035 0.0013 0.0032 -0.0008 -87 200 45 -152 50 -184 56 -216 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0035 0.0011 0.0035 -0.0016 -86 179 44 -136 52 -280 60 -424 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0033 0.0012 0.0043 -0.0012 -81 188 42 -143 58 -239 75 -335 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0068 -0.0019 -67 169 35 -129 77 -321 119 -514 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0026 0.0010 0.0077 -0.0026 -63 151 32 -115 83 -404 134 -694 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0034 0.0007 0.0037 -0.0039 -84 112 43 -85 54 -572 65 -1058 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0011 0.0012 0.0141 -0.0010 -28 194 14 -148 131 -211 248 -275 
0.2 0 0 -0.0037 0.0013 0.0029 -0.0013 -91 207 46 -157 46 -157 46 -157 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0036 0.0013 0.0035 -0.0015 -88 201 45 -153 50 -162 55 -171 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0035 0.0011 0.0037 -0.0023 -86 179 44 -136 49 -260 53 -384 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0033 0.0012 0.0045 -0.0019 -82 189 42 -143 58 -171 74 -199 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0028 0.0011 0.0070 -0.0025 -68 170 35 -129 77 -143 119 -156 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0026 0.0010 0.0079 -0.0031 -63 151 32 -115 81 -197 130 -280 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0034 0.0007 0.0039 -0.0046 -85 112 43 -85 40 -587 36 -1088 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0011 0.0012 0.0144 -0.0013 -28 195 14 -148 146 347 277 841 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0037 0.0013 0.0024 0.0000 -90 206 46 -157 46 -157 46 -157 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0036 0.0013 0.0030 -0.0002 -87 200 45 -153 51 -208 58 -263 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0035 0.0011 0.0033 -0.0010 -86 179 44 -136 57 -324 69 -511 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0033 0.0012 0.0041 -0.0007 -81 188 42 -143 62 -310 83 -476 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0066 -0.0015 -68 170 35 -129 85 -496 136 -862 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0026 0.0010 0.0075 -0.0022 -63 151 32 -115 95 -619 158 -1123 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0034 0.0007 0.0036 -0.0034 -84 112 43 -85 68 -655 92 -1226 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0011 0.0012 0.0139 -0.0008 -28 194 14 -148 143 -649 271 -1151 
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Change in social 
surplus, w=0 
Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 






0 0 0 -42 46 -42 46 -42 46 409 -738 -329 -0.09 
 0.010 0.010 -41 45 -35 13 -29 -19 494 -1017 -523 -0.15 
 0.015 0.045 -40 40 -31 -104 -23 -248 537 -1998 -1461 -0.42 
 0.030 0.030 -38 42 -21 -54 -4 -150 666 -1577 -911 -0.26 
 0.075 0.060 -31 38 11 -155 54 -347 1057 -2421 -1364 -0.39 
 0.090 0.090 -29 33 22 -257 73 -546 1190 -3272 -2082 -0.59 
 0.020 0.150 -39 24 -28 -463 -17 -949 580 -4993 -4413 -1.26 
 0.200 0.020 -11 43 105 -20 222 -84 2190 -1297 894 0.26 
0.2 0 0 -42 46 -42 46 -42 46 451 -1673 -1221 -0.35 
 0.010 0.010 -41 45 -35 36 -30 27 535 -1921 -1386 -0.40 
 0.015 0.045 -40 40 -35 -84 -31 -207 574 -2886 -2313 -0.66 
 0.030 0.030 -38 42 -22 14 -6 -13 704 -2418 -1714 -0.49 
 0.075 0.060 -31 38 11 24 53 11 1092 -3121 -2029 -0.58 
 0.090 0.090 -29 33 20 -49 69 -131 1220 -3923 -2703 -0.77 
 0.020 0.150 -39 24 -43 -477 -46 -978 603 -5864 -5261 -1.50 
 0.200 0.020 -11 44 120 538 251 1033 2229 -1586 643 0.18 
-0.16 0 0 -42 46 -42 46 -42 46 378 5 383 0.11 
 0.010 0.010 -41 45 -34 -10 -27 -66 464 -299 165 0.05 
 0.015 0.045 -40 40 -27 -148 -15 -335 510 -1292 -782 -0.22 
 0.030 0.030 -38 42 -17 -124 4 -291 637 -908 -271 -0.08 
 0.075 0.060 -31 38 20 -329 71 -695 1031 -1866 -834 -0.24 
 0.090 0.090 -29 33 34 -471 97 -975 1167 -2755 -1588 -0.45 
 0.020 0.150 -39 24 -15 -546 10 -1116 563 -4298 -3735 -1.07 
 0.200 0.020 -11 44 117 -458 246 -959 2160 -1069 1091 0.31 
Note: Change in TS for H equals $2.08 million, for N equals -$2.88 million 
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 Table 5.7.3 Scenario V: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of Constant Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports  
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  















(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None -329 -27.4 -0.04 9.5 0.11 141.2 0.04 100.0 0.25 -47.5 -0.01 0.6 0.01 191.2 0.04 
 Es -523 -39.2 -0.06 11.0 0.12 142.9 0.04 120.4 0.30 -87.6 -0.02 0.0 0.00 200.1 0.04 
 Nm -1461 -86.4 -0.13 8.8 0.10 -41.6 -0.01 127.6 0.31 -309.9 -0.09 -4.8 -0.06 -2.2 0.00 
 Em -911 -63.0 -0.10 14.1 0.16 146.8 0.04 161.4 0.40 -167.8 -0.05 -1.1 -0.01 218.6 0.05 
 Hm -1364 -96.0 -0.15 22.7 0.25 251.3 0.07 256.6 0.63 -246.6 -0.07 -1.4 -0.02 367.5 0.08 
 El -2082 -134.9 -0.21 23.6 0.26 162.2 0.05 286.7 0.71 -409.0 -0.12 -4.5 -0.05 278.9 0.06 
 Nl -4413 -232.3 -0.36 -0.6 -0.01 -669.5 -0.19 127.6 0.31 -1016.0 -0.29 -20.5 -0.24 -699.2 -0.16 
 Hl 894 -16.6 -0.03 60.3 0.67 1339.8 0.39 544.7 1.34 383.1 0.11 17.2 0.20 1675.3 0.37 
Sub. None -1221 -72.3 -0.11 7.4 0.08 -33.5 -0.01 107.3 0.26 -258.9 -0.07 -4.0 -0.05 -0.2 0.00 
 Es -1386 -82.7 -0.13 9.0 0.10 -25.9 -0.01 127.4 0.31 -291.9 -0.08 -4.4 -0.05 15.2 0.00 
 Nm -2313 -129.2 -0.20 6.7 0.07 -210.0 -0.06 133.6 0.33 -511.7 -0.14 -9.2 -0.11 -187.1 -0.04 
 Em -1714 -103.4 -0.16 12.2 0.14 -10.1 0.00 168.0 0.41 -357.9 -0.10 -5.2 -0.06 46.7 0.01 
 Hm -2029 -129.6 -0.20 21.2 0.24 122.8 0.04 262.7 0.65 -403.7 -0.11 -4.7 -0.06 226.9 0.05 
 El -2703 -166.1 -0.25 22.2 0.25 41.4 0.01 292.1 0.72 -555.8 -0.16 -7.6 -0.09 146.7 0.03 
 Nl -5261 -274.5 -0.42 -3.1 -0.03 -844.0 -0.24 130.4 0.32 -1218.0 -0.34 -24.9 -0.29 -892.0 -0.20 
 Hl 643 -30.0 -0.05 60.4 0.67 1304.7 0.38 553.4 1.36 325.7 0.09 16.1 0.19 1639.2 0.36 
Com. None 383 8.3 0.01 11.2 0.12 281.5 0.08 94.8 0.23 121.0 0.03 4.2 0.05 345.2 0.08 
 Es 165 -4.7 -0.01 12.7 0.14 278.5 0.08 115.3 0.28 75.4 0.02 3.5 0.04 348.9 0.08 
 Nm -782 -52.4 -0.08 10.5 0.12 93.8 0.03 123.3 0.30 -148.8 -0.04 -1.3 -0.02 146.6 0.03 
 Em -271 -30.9 -0.05 15.6 0.17 272.8 0.08 156.5 0.39 -16.1 0.00 2.2 0.03 356.8 0.08 
 Hm -834 -69.3 -0.11 23.9 0.27 354.4 0.10 252.0 0.62 -121.3 -0.03 1.4 0.02 480.4 0.11 
 El -1588 -110.0 -0.17 24.7 0.28 259.0 0.07 282.8 0.70 -292.0 -0.08 -1.9 -0.02 385.1 0.09 
 Nl -3735 -198.6 -0.30 1.3 0.01 -528.9 -0.15 125.9 0.31 -854.4 -0.24 -16.9 -0.20 -543.7 -0.12 
 Hl 1091 -6.1 -0.01 60.2 0.67 1367.5 2.10 537.9 1.32 428.2 0.12 18.1 0.21 1703.6 0.38 
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0 0 0 -0.0174 0.0062 0.0125 -0.0028 -427 979 220 -744 220 -744 220 -744 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0168 0.0060 0.0151 -0.0038 -413 951 213 -722 239 -873 266 -1024 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0165 0.0054 0.0164 -0.0075 -405 850 209 -644 249 -1326 289 -2009 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0157 0.0056 0.0204 -0.0059 -384 893 199 -677 279 -1132 359 -1586 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0130 0.0051 0.0324 -0.0091 -320 805 166 -610 370 -1521 574 -2432 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0121 0.0045 0.0364 -0.0123 -298 716 155 -541 401 -1911 647 -3281 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0163 0.0034 0.0178 -0.0187 -398 531 206 -401 259 -2695 312 -4990 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0054 0.0058 0.0671 -0.0049 -132 922 70 -699 639 -1002 1209 -1305 
0.2 0 0 -0.0175 0.0062 0.0138 -0.0063 -428 983 221 -745 221 -745 221 -745 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0169 0.0060 0.0164 -0.0072 -414 954 214 -723 239 -767 264 -811 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0166 0.0054 0.0176 -0.0108 -407 853 210 -645 233 -1230 256 -1816 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0157 0.0057 0.0216 -0.0091 -386 897 200 -679 276 -810 352 -941 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0131 0.0051 0.0334 -0.0117 -321 809 167 -611 369 -674 571 -738 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0122 0.0045 0.0374 -0.0147 -299 719 156 -543 390 -932 624 -1321 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0163 0.0034 0.0185 -0.0220 -400 534 207 -402 190 -2762 174 -5122 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0054 0.0059 0.0682 -0.0059 -132 926 70 -702 710 1642 1350 3986 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0174 0.0062 0.0116 0.0000 -428 981 220 -746 220 -746 220 -746 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0169 0.0060 0.0142 -0.0011 -414 953 213 -724 246 -987 279 -1249 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0166 0.0054 0.0156 -0.0048 -406 852 210 -646 270 -1535 331 -2425 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0157 0.0057 0.0195 -0.0034 -385 895 199 -680 298 -1469 396 -2259 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0131 0.0051 0.0316 -0.0070 -320 807 166 -612 411 -2347 656 -4082 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0122 0.0045 0.0357 -0.0103 -298 718 155 -543 458 -2928 760 -5312 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0163 0.0034 0.0172 -0.0161 -399 533 206 -402 323 -3093 440 -5785 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0054 0.0058 0.0661 -0.0040 -132 924 70 -701 696 -3079 1322 -5457 
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Change in social 
surplus, w=0 
Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 






0 0 0 -197 222 -197 222 -197 222 1944 -3505 -1561 -0.45 
 0.010 0.010 -190 215 -163 64 -137 -87 2348 -4830 -2482 -0.71 
 0.015 0.045 -186 192 -146 -490 -106 -1173 2551 -9492 -6941 -1.98 
 0.030 0.030 -176 202 -95 -252 -15 -707 3163 -7490 -4327 -1.24 
 0.075 0.060 -144 182 60 -729 264 -1640 5023 -11502 -6479 -1.85 
 0.090 0.090 -133 161 113 -1209 359 -2579 5651 -15543 -9891 -2.83 
 0.020 0.150 -183 117 -129 -2178 -76 -4472 2755 -23716 -20961 -5.99 
 0.200 0.020 -52 209 517 -94 1087 -397 10404 -6158 4245 1.21 
0.2 0 0 -197 224 -197 224 -197 224 2144 -7946 -5802 -1.66 
 0.010 0.010 -190 218 -165 174 -140 130 2543 -9124 -6581 -1.88 
 0.015 0.045 -187 194 -164 -391 -142 -977 2725 -13710 -10985 -3.14 
 0.030 0.030 -176 204 -100 73 -24 -59 3345 -11487 -8142 -2.33 
 0.075 0.060 -144 183 58 120 260 57 5186 -14824 -9638 -2.75 
 0.090 0.090 -133 162 101 -227 336 -615 5797 -18636 -12839 -3.67 
 0.020 0.150 -183 118 -200 -2242 -216 -4602 2866 -27855 -24989 -7.14 
 0.200 0.020 -53 210 588 2554 1228 4898 10587 -7534 3053 0.87 
-0.16 0 0 -197 221 -197 221 -197 221 1795 23 1818 0.52 
 0.010 0.010 -190 215 -158 -48 -125 -310 2203 -1419 785 0.22 
 0.015 0.045 -187 192 -126 -697 -65 -1587 2422 -6138 -3716 -1.06 
 0.030 0.030 -176 202 -78 -588 21 -1377 3026 -4313 -1286 -0.37 
 0.075 0.060 -144 182 101 -1553 345 -3288 4899 -8862 -3963 -1.13 
 0.090 0.090 -133 161 169 -2224 472 -4608 5542 -13084 -7542 -2.15 
 0.020 0.150 -183 117 -67 -2574 50 -5265 2675 -20417 -17742 -5.07 
 0.200 0.020 -53 209 574 -2169 1200 -4547 10260 -5077 5183 1.48 
Note: Change in TS for H equals $9.88 million, for N equals -$13.68 million. 
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Table 5.8.3 Scenario VI: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of Constant Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports   
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  











intake Fat (g) % 
Fiber 
(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None -1561 -130.2 -0.20 45.1 0.50 670.6 0.19 475.1 1.17 -225.8 -0.06 2.6 0.03 908.3 0.20 
 Es -2482 -186.4 -0.29 52.4 0.58 678.7 0.20 571.8 1.41 -416.1 -0.12 -0.1 0.00 950.6 0.21 
 Nm -6941 -410.5 -0.63 41.7 0.46 -197.7 -0.06 606.0 1.49 -1472.1 -0.41 -22.9 -0.27 -10.5 0.00 
 Em -4327 -299.3 -0.46 67.0 0.75 697.2 0.20 766.5 1.89 -796.9 -0.22 -5.4 -0.06 1038.3 0.23 
 Hm -6479 -456.1 -0.70 107.8 1.20 1193.7 0.34 1218.7 3.00 -1171.2 -0.33 -6.4 -0.07 1745.4 0.39 
 El -9891 -640.7 -0.98 112.0 1.25 770.2 0.22 1362.0 3.35 -1943.0 -0.55 -21.2 -0.25 1324.7 0.29 
 Nl -20961 -1103.2 -1.69 -3.1 -0.03 -3180.0 -0.92 606.2 1.49 -4826.0 -1.36 -97.3 -1.13 -3321.2 -0.74 
 Hl 4245 -79.0 -0.12 286.4 3.19 6364.2 1.84 2587.5 6.36 1819.7 0.51 81.9 0.95 7957.4 1.77 
Sub. None -5802 -343.5 -0.53 35.2 0.39 -159.0 -0.05 509.4 1.25 -1229.6 -0.35 -19.1 -0.22 -0.9 0.00 
 Es -6581 -392.7 -0.60 42.8 0.48 -123.0 -0.04 605.1 1.49 -1386.3 -0.39 -21.0 -0.25 72.2 0.02 
 Nm -10985 -613.5 -0.94 31.8 0.35 -997.6 -0.29 634.6 1.56 -2430.6 -0.69 -43.7 -0.51 -888.7 -0.20 
 Em -8142 -491.3 -0.75 58.1 0.65 -48.2 -0.01 797.9 1.96 -1699.9 -0.48 -24.9 -0.29 221.6 0.05 
 Hm -9638 -615.4 -0.94 100.8 1.12 583.3 0.17 1247.9 3.07 -1917.8 -0.54 -22.5 -0.26 1077.8 0.24 
 El -12839 -789.1 -1.21 105.3 1.17 196.9 0.06 1387.4 3.41 -2640.2 -0.74 -36.3 -0.42 697.0 0.15 
 Nl -24989 -1303.7 -2.00 -14.5 -0.16 -4009.1 -1.16 619.3 1.52 -5785.5 -1.63 -118.4 -1.38 -4237.1 -0.94 
 Hl 3053 -142.5 -0.22 287.0 3.20 6197.1 1.79 2628.5 6.46 1547.3 0.44 76.5 0.89 7786.1 1.73 
Com. None 1818 39.6 0.06 53.3 0.59 1337.1 0.39 450.3 1.11 574.8 0.16 20.0 0.23 1639.6 0.36 
 Es 785 -22.3 -0.03 60.3 0.67 1322.7 0.38 547.6 1.35 357.9 0.10 16.7 0.19 1657.2 0.37 
 Nm -3716 -248.9 -0.38 49.9 0.56 445.3 0.13 585.5 1.44 -706.9 -0.20 -6.3 -0.07 696.3 0.15 
 Em -1286 -146.5 -0.22 74.3 0.83 1295.7 0.37 743.6 1.83 -76.7 -0.02 10.2 0.12 1694.9 0.38 
 Hm -3963 -329.4 -0.51 113.6 1.26 1683.5 0.49 1197.1 2.94 -576.0 -0.16 6.4 0.08 2281.7 0.51 
 El -7542 -522.5 -0.80 117.6 1.31 1230.4 0.35 1343.2 3.30 -1386.9 -0.39 -9.2 -0.11 1829.0 0.41 
 Nl -17742 -943.3 -1.45 6.4 0.07 -2512.2 -0.72 598.0 1.47 -4058.3 -1.14 -80.4 -0.94 -2582.7 -0.57 
 Hl 5183 -29.1 -0.04 286.0 3.19 6495.5 1.87 2555.2 6.28 2033.9 0.57 86.1 1.00 8092.1 1.80 
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0 0 0 -0.0348 0.0124 0.0251 -0.0055 -849 1962 443 -1485 443 -1485 443 -1485 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0337 0.0120 0.0303 -0.0076 -821 1905 429 -1440 482 -1742 536 -2044 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0331 0.0107 0.0329 -0.0150 -807 1702 422 -1283 503 -2642 583 -4002 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0313 0.0113 0.0408 -0.0118 -765 1789 401 -1351 563 -2257 725 -3163 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0260 0.0102 0.0648 -0.0182 -637 1613 338 -1214 752 -3028 1166 -4842 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0243 0.0091 0.0729 -0.0245 -593 1434 316 -1076 816 -3799 1317 -6522 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0325 0.0067 0.0355 -0.0374 -793 1064 415 -794 523 -5340 630 -9886 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0107 0.0117 0.1341 -0.0097 -263 1847 144 -1396 1320 -1999 2496 -2603 
0.2 0 0 -0.0349 0.0124 0.0276 -0.0125 -852 1969 445 -1485 445 -1485 445 -1485 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0338 0.0121 0.0328 -0.0144 -824 1912 431 -1441 482 -1529 533 -1616 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0332 0.0108 0.0351 -0.0216 -810 1708 424 -1283 470 -2448 516 -3612 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0315 0.0113 0.0431 -0.0181 -768 1796 403 -1351 558 -1613 712 -1874 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0261 0.0102 0.0669 -0.0234 -639 1620 339 -1216 750 -1341 1160 -1466 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0243 0.0091 0.0747 -0.0294 -595 1440 317 -1078 794 -1850 1272 -2621 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0326 0.0068 0.0369 -0.0440 -796 1068 417 -794 384 -5462 350 -10130 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0108 0.0117 0.1365 -0.0119 -264 1854 144 -1399 1467 3275 2790 7949 
-0.16 0 0 -0.0349 0.0124 0.0231 0.0000 -851 1967 443 -1493 443 -1493 443 -1493 
 0.010 0.010 -0.0337 0.0120 0.0284 -0.0022 -823 1909 430 -1448 495 -1973 561 -2497 
 0.015 0.045 -0.0332 0.0108 0.0312 -0.0097 -809 1706 423 -1289 545 -3063 667 -4838 
 0.030 0.030 -0.0314 0.0113 0.0390 -0.0068 -767 1794 402 -1357 601 -2933 801 -4509 
 0.075 0.060 -0.0261 0.0102 0.0632 -0.0140 -638 1617 338 -1220 835 -4678 1332 -8136 
 0.090 0.090 -0.0243 0.0091 0.0714 -0.0207 -595 1438 316 -1081 931 -5825 1547 -10570 
 0.020 0.150 -0.0326 0.0067 0.0345 -0.0322 -795 1067 416 -798 652 -6137 887 -11475 
 0.200 0.020 -0.0107 0.0117 0.1323 -0.0080 -264 1852 144 -1400 1437 -6146 2729 -10893 
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      Table 5.9.2 Scenario VII: Welfare (million US$) and Caloric Effects of Constant Government Promotional Expenditures for  







Change in social 
surplus, w=0 
Change in social 
surplus, w=0.5 
Change in social 
surplus, w=1 
Change in caloric-intake 
per capita per year 
(calories) 






0 0 0 -386 450 -386 450 -386 450 3888 -7011 -3123 -0.89 
 0.010 0.010 -372 437 -319 135 -265 -167 4697 -9661 -4964 -1.42 
 0.015 0.045 -365 392 -285 -968 -204 -2328 5102 -18984 -13882 -3.97 
 0.030 0.030 -344 411 -182 -495 -20 -1401 6325 -14979 -8654 -2.47 
 0.075 0.060 -279 372 135 -1442 549 -3256 10045 -23004 -12958 -3.70 
 0.090 0.090 -258 330 243 -2392 743 -5115 11303 -31086 -19783 -5.65 
 0.020 0.150 -358 243 -250 -4303 -143 -8849 5509 -47431 -41922 -11.98 
 0.200 0.020 -100 424 1076 -180 2252 -783 20807 -12317 8491 2.43 
0.2 0 0 -387 457 -387 457 -387 457 4289 -15892 -11603 -3.32 
 0.010 0.010 -373 444 -322 356 -271 269 5085 -18248 -13163 -3.76 
 0.015 0.045 -366 398 -320 -767 -274 -1931 5451 -27420 -21970 -6.28 
 0.030 0.030 -344 417 -190 156 -36 -105 6690 -22974 -16285 -4.65 
 0.075 0.060 -280 377 131 251 541 126 10372 -29648 -19276 -5.51 
 0.090 0.090 -259 335 219 -437 696 -1209 11594 -37272 -25678 -7.34 
 0.020 0.150 -359 247 -392 -4421 -426 -9090 5732 -55710 -49978 -14.28 
 0.200 0.020 -100 428 1223 5102 2546 9776 21174 -15068 6106 1.74 
-0.16 0 0 -388 447 -388 447 -388 447 3590 46 3636 1.04 
 0.010 0.010 -373 434 -308 -91 -242 -615 4407 -2837 1570 0.45 
 0.015 0.045 -366 389 -244 -1385 -122 -3159 4844 -12275 -7432 -2.12 
 0.030 0.030 -345 409 -146 -1167 54 -2743 6052 -8625 -2573 -0.74 
 0.075 0.060 -280 370 217 -3088 714 -6546 9798 -17724 -7926 -2.26 
 0.090 0.090 -259 329 357 -4415 972 -9160 11083 -26168 -15085 -4.31 
 0.020 0.150 -359 241 -124 -5097 112 -10436 5350 -40833 -35483 -10.14 
 0.200 0.020 -100 424 1192 -4322 2485 -9068 20519 -10154 10365 2.96 
Note: Change in TS for H equals $19.76 million, for N equals -$27.36 million 
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Table 5.9.3 Scenario VII: Caloric and Nutritional Effects of Constant Government Promotional Expenditures for Agricultural Exports   
Absolute changes in yearly intake level &  













(g) % (-) 
Fiber 
(g) %  
Vit. A 
(mg) %  
Vit. C 
(mg) %  
Calcium 
(mg) %  
Iron 
(mg) %  
Sodium 
(mg) %  
Ind. None -3123 -260 -0.40 90.2 1.00 1341 0.39 950 2.34 -452 -0.13 5.2 0.06 1817 0.40 
 Es -4964 -373 -0.57 104.7 1.17 1357 0.39 1144 2.81 -832 -0.23 -0.1 0.00 1901 0.42 
 Nm -13882 -821 -1.26 83.5 0.93 -395 -0.11 1212 2.98 -2944 -0.83 -45.9 -0.53 -21 0.00 
 Em -8654 -599 -0.92 134.0 1.49 1394 0.40 1533 3.77 -1594 -0.45 -10.8 -0.13 2077 0.46 
 Hm -12958 -912 -1.40 215.6 2.40 2387 0.69 2437 5.99 -2342 -0.66 -12.8 -0.15 3491 0.78 
 El -19783 -1281 -1.97 224.0 2.50 1540 0.44 2724 6.70 -3886 -1.10 -42.5 -0.50 2649 0.59 
 Nl -41922 -2206 -3.38 -6.1 -0.07 -6360 -1.83 1212 2.98 -9652 -2.72 -194.6 -2.27 -6642 -1.47 
 Hl 8491 -158 -0.24 572.9 6.38 12728 3.67 5175 12.73 3639 1.03 163.7 1.91 15915 3.53 
Sub. None -11603 -687 -1.05 70.4 0.78 -318 -0.09 1019 2.51 -2459 -0.69 -38.2 -0.45 -2 0.00 
 Es -13163 -785 -1.20 85.6 0.95 -246 -0.07 1210 2.98 -2773 -0.78 -42.1 -0.49 144 0.03 
 Nm -21970 -1227 -1.88 63.6 0.71 -1995 -0.58 1269 3.12 -4861 -1.37 -87.4 -1.02 -1777 -0.39 
 Em -16285 -983 -1.51 116.3 1.29 -96 -0.03 1596 3.92 -3400 -0.96 -49.8 -0.58 443 0.10 
 Hm -19276 -1231 -1.89 201.6 2.25 1167 0.34 2496 6.14 -3836 -1.08 -45.0 -0.52 2156 0.48 
 El -25678 -1578 -2.42 210.6 2.35 394 0.11 2775 6.82 -5280 -1.49 -72.6 -0.85 1394 0.31 
 Nl -49978 -2607 -4.00 -29.1 -0.32 -8018 -2.31 1239 3.05 -11571 -3.26 -236.7 -2.76 -8474 -1.88 
 Hl 6106 -285 -0.44 573.9 6.39 12394 3.57 5257 12.93 3095 0.87 153.0 1.78 15572 3.46 
Com. None 3636 79 0.12 106.6 1.19 2674 0.77 901 2.21 1150 0.32 39.9 0.47 3279 0.73 
 Es 1570 -45 -0.07 120.5 1.34 2645 0.76 1095 2.69 716 0.20 33.4 0.39 3314 0.74 
 Nm -7432 -498 -0.76 99.8 1.11 891 0.26 1171 2.88 -1414 -0.40 -12.6 -0.15 1393 0.31 
 Em -2573 -293 -0.45 148.6 1.66 2591 0.75 1487 3.66 -153 -0.04 20.5 0.24 3390 0.75 
 Hm -7926 -659 -1.01 227.2 2.53 3367 0.97 2394 5.89 -1152 -0.32 12.9 0.15 4563 1.01 
 El -15085 -1045 -1.60 235.1 2.62 2461 0.71 2686 6.61 -2774 -0.78 -18.4 -0.21 3658 0.81 
 Nl -35483 -1887 -2.89 12.7 0.14 -5024 -1.45 1196 2.94 -8117 -2.29 -160.8 -1.87 -5165 -1.15 
 Hl 10365 -58 -0.09 572.1 6.37 12991 3.75 5110 12.57 4068 1.15 172.2 2.01 16184 3.59 
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